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Preface 
 
In response to Air Force Secretary James G. Roche’s charge to reinvigorate the systems 
engineering profession, the Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT) undertook a broad spec-
trum of initiatives that included creating new and innovative instructional material.  The material 
included case studies of past programs to teach the principles of systems engineering via “real 
world” examples.  
 
Four case studies, the first set in a planned series, were developed with the oversight of 
the Subcommittee on Systems Engineering to the Air University Board of Visitors.  The 
Subcommittee included the following distinguished individuals:  
 
 Chairman 
  Dr. Alex Levis, AF/ST 
 
 Members 
  Tom Sheridan, Brigadier General  
  Dr. Daniel Stewart, AFMC/CD 
  Dr. George Friedman, University of Southern California 
  Dr. Andrew Sage, George Mason University 
 Dr. Elliot Axelband, University of Southern California 
 Dr. Dennis Buede, Innovative Decisions Inc 
 Dr. Dave Evans, Aerospace Institute   
 
Dr. Levis and the Subcommittee on Systems Engineering crafted the idea of publishing 
these case studies, reviewed several proposals, selected four systems as the initial cases for study, 
and continued to provide guidance throughout their development.  The Subcommittee members 
have been a guiding force to charter, review, and approve the work of the authors.  The four case 
studies produced in that series were the C-5A Galaxy, the F-111, the Hubble Space Telescope, 
and the Theater Battle Management Core System.  The second series of case studies produced 
were the B-2 Spirit Stealth Bomber and the Joint Air-To-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM).  
 
This third series includes the Global Positioning System (GPS).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
         Approved for Public Release; Distribution Unlimited 
 
The views expressed in this Case Study are those of the author(s) and do not reflect the 
official policy or position of the United States Air Force, the Department of Defense, or the 
United States Government 
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Foreword 
 
At the direction of the Secretary of the Air Force, Dr. James G. Roche, the Air Force 
Institute of Technology (AFIT) established a Center for Systems Engineering (CSE) at its Wright 
Patterson AFB, campus in 2002.  With academic oversight by a Subcommittee on Systems Engi-
neering, chaired by Air Force Chief Scientist Dr. Alex Lewis, the CSE was tasked to develop case 
studies focusing on the application of systems engineering principles within various Air Force 
programs.  The committee drafted an initial case outline and learning objectives, and suggested 
the use of the Friedman-Sage Framework to guide overall analysis.  
 
The CSE contracted for management support with Universal Technology Corporation 
(UTC) in July 2003.  Principal investigators for the four case studies published in the initial 
series included Mr. John Griffin for the C-5A, Dr. G. Keith Richey for the F-111, Mr. James 
Mattice for the Hubble Telescope, and Mr. Josh Collens for the Theater Battle Management Core 
System.  These cases were published in 2004.  Two additional case studies have since been 
added to this series with the principal investigators being Mr. John Griffin for the B-2 and Dr. 
Bill Stockman for the JASSM.  All case studies (with the exception of JASSM) are available on 
the CSE website [http://www.afit.edu/cse]. 
 
The Department of Defense continues to develop and acquire joint complex systems that 
deliver needed capabilities demanded by our warfighter.  Systems engineering is the technical 
and technical management process that focuses explicitly on delivering and sustaining robust, 
high-quality, affordable products.  The Air Force leadership, from the Secretary of the Air Force 
through the Commander of the Air Force Materiel Command, has collectively stated the need to 
mature a sound systems engineering process throughout the Air Force.  
 
Plans exist for future case studies focusing on other areas.  Suggestions have included 
other Joint-service programs, logistics-led programs, science and technology/laboratory efforts, 
additional aircraft programs, and successful commercial systems.  
 
As we uncovered historical facts and conducted key interviews with program managers 
and chief engineers, both within the government and those working for the various prime and 
subcontractors, we concluded that systems programs face similar challenges today.  Applicable 
systems engineering principles and the effects of communication and the environment continue 
to challenge our ability to provide a balanced technical solution.  We look forward to your 
comments on this GPS case, our other CSE published studies, and future case studies.  
 
     
 
 
 
     GEORGE E. MOONEY, SES 
     Director, Air Force Center for Systems Engineering  
     Air Force Institute of Technology 
 http://www.afit.edu/cse 
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1. SYSTEMS ENGINEERING PRINCIPLES 
 
1.1 General Systems Engineering Process 
 
1.1.1 Introduction 
 
The Department of Defense continues to develop and acquire joint systems and deliver 
needed capabilities to the warfighter.  With a constant objective to improve and mature the acquisi-
tion process, it continues to pursue new and creative methodologies to purchase these technically 
complex systems.  A sound systems engineering process, focused explicitly on delivering and 
sustaining robust, high-quality, affordable products that meet the needs of customers and stake-
holders must continue to evolve and mature.  Systems engineering is the technical and technical 
management process that results in delivered products and systems that exhibit the best balance of 
cost and performance.  The process must operate effectively with desired mission-level 
capabilities, establish system-level requirements, allocate these down to the lowest level of the 
design, and ensure validation and verification of performance, while meeting the cost and schedule 
constraints. 
 
The systems engineering process changes as the program progresses from one phase to 
the next, as do tools and procedures.  The process also changes over the decades, maturing, 
growing, and evolving from the base established during the conduct of past programs.  Systems 
engineering has a long history.  Examples can be found demonstrating application of effective 
engineering and engineering management, as well as poorly applied, but well-defined processes.  
Throughout the many decades during which systems engineering has emerged as a discipline, 
many practices, processes, heuristics, and tools have been developed, documented, and applied.  
 
System requirements are critical to all facets of successful system program development.  
First, system development must proceed from a well-developed set of requirements.  Second, 
regardless of the evolutionary acquisition approach, the system requirements must flow down to 
all subsystems and lower-level components.  And third, the system requirements must be stable, 
balanced, and must properly reflect all activities in all intended environments.  However, system 
requirements are not unchangeable.  As the system design proceeds, if a requirement or set of 
requirements is proving excessively expensive to satisfy, the process must rebalance schedule, 
cost, and performance by changing or modifying the requirements or set of requirements.  
 
Systems engineering includes making key system and design trades early in the process to 
establish the system architecture.  These architectural artifacts can depict any new system, legacy 
system, modifications thereto, introduction of new technologies, and overall system-level behavior 
and performance.  Modeling and simulation are generally employed to organize and assess 
architectural alternatives at this stage.  System and subsystem design follows the functional 
architecture.  System architectures are modified if elements are too risky, expensive, or time-
consuming.  Both newer object-oriented analysis and design, and classic structured analysis 
using functional decomposition and information flows/data modeling occur.  Design proceeds 
logically using key design reviews, tradeoff analysis, and prototyping to reduce any high-risk 
technology areas. 
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Important to the efficient decomposition and creation of functional and physical archi-
tectural designs are the management of interfaces and the integration of subsystems.  Interface 
management and integration is applied to subsystems within a system or across a large, complex 
system of systems.  Once a solution is planned, analyzed, designed, and constructed, validation 
and verification take place to ensure satisfaction of requirements.  Definition of test criteria, 
measures of effectiveness (MOEs), and measures of performance (MOPs) are established as part 
of the requirements process, taking place well before any component/subsystem assembly design 
and construction occurs.   
 
There are several excellent representations of the systems engineering process presented 
in the literature.  These depictions present the current state of the art in maturity and evaluation 
of the systems engineering process.  One can find systems engineering process definitions, 
guides, and handbooks from the International Council on Systems Engineering (INCOSE), 
European Industrial Association (EIA), Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE), 
and various Department of Defense (DoD) agencies and organizations.  They show the process as 
it should be applied by today’s experienced practitioner.  One of these processes, long used by 
the Defense Acquisition University (DAU), is depicted in Figure 1-1.  It should be noted that this 
model is not accomplished in a single pass.  This iterative and nested process gets repeated to the 
lowest level of definition of the design and its interfaces. 
 
 
Figure 1-1. The Systems Engineering Process, Defense Acquisition University 
 
The DAU model, like all others, has been documented in the last two decades, and has 
expanded and developed to reflect a changing environment.  Systems are becoming increasingly 
complex internally and more interconnected externally.  The process used to develop aircraft and 
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systems of the past was effective at the time.  It served the needs of the practitioners and resulted 
in many successful systems in our inventory.  Notwithstanding, the cost and schedule 
performance of the past programs are replete with examples of well-managed programs and ones 
with less-stellar execution.  As the nation entered the 1980s and 1990s, large DoD and 
commercial acquisitions experienced overrunning costs and slipping schedules.  The aerospace 
industry and its organizations were becoming larger and were more geographically and culturally 
distributed.  Large aerospace companies have worked diligently to establish common systems 
engineering practices across their enterprises.  However, because of the mega-trend of teaming in 
large (and some small) programs, these common practices must be understood and used beyond 
the enterprise and to multiple corporations.  It is essential that the systems engineering process 
govern integration, balance, allocation, and verification, and be useful to the entire program team 
down to the design and interface level.  
 
Today, many factors overshadow new acquisition; including system-of-systems (SoS) con-
text, network centric warfare and operations, and rapid growth in information technology.  These 
factors are driving a more sophisticated systems engineering process with more complex and 
capable features, along with new tools and procedures.  One area of increased focus of the sys-
tems engineering process is the informational systems architectural definitions used during system 
analysis.  This process, described in DoD Architectural Framework (DoDAF), emphasizes greater 
reliance on reusable architectural views describing the system context and concept of operations, 
interoperability, information and data flows, and network service-oriented characteristics. 
 
1.1.2 Case Study 
  
The systems engineering process to be used in today’s complex system and system-of-
systems is a process matured and founded on principles developed in the past.  Examination of 
systems engineering principles used on programs, both past and present, can provide a wealth of 
lessons to be used in applying and understanding today’s process.  It was this thinking that led to 
the construction of the AFIT CSE case studies.  
 
The purpose of developing detailed case studies is to support the teaching of systems 
engineering principles.  They facilitate learning by emphasizing to the student the long-term conse-
quences of the systems engineering and programmatic decisions on program success.  The systems 
engineering case studies assist in discussion of both successful and unsuccessful methodologies, 
processes, principles, tools and decision material to assess the outcome of alternatives at the 
program/system level.  In addition, the importance of using skills from multiple professions and 
engineering disciplines, and collecting, assessing, and integrating varied functional data is empha-
sized.  When they are taken together, the student is provided real-world detailed examples of 
how the process attempts to balance cost, schedule, and performance. 
 
The utilization and mis-utilization of systems engineering principles are highlighted, with 
special emphasis on the conditions that foster and impede good systems engineering practice.  
Case studies are used to illustrate both good and bad implementation of acquisition management 
and learning principles, such as:  
• Every system provides a satisfactory balanced and effective product to a customer  
• Effective requirements analysis was applied 
• Consistent and rigorous applications of systems engineering management was applied  
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• Effective test planning was accomplished  
• There were effective major technical program reviews 
• Continuous risk assessments and management was implemented 
• Cost estimates and policies were reliable 
• Disciplined application of configuration management used 
• A rigorous system boundary was defined  
• Disciplined methodologies for complex systems used 
• Problem solving incorporated understanding of the system within the bigger 
environment (customer’s customer) 
 
The systems engineering process transforms an operational need into a system or several 
system-of-systems elements.  Architectural elements of the system are allocated and translated into 
detailed design requirements by the systems engineering process.  The systems engineering 
process, from the identification of the need to the development and utilization of the product, 
must continuously integrate and balance the requirements, cost, and schedule to provide an 
operationally effective system throughout its life cycle.  Systems engineering case studies 
highlight the various interfaces and communications to achieve this balance, which include: 
• The program manager/systems engineering interface is essential between the operational 
user and developer (acquirer) to translate the needs into performance requirements for 
the system and subsystems. 
• The government/contractor interface is essential for the practice of systems engineering 
to translate and allocate the performance requirements into detailed requirements.  
• The developer (acquirer)/user interface within the project is essential for the systems 
engineering practice of integration and balance. 
 
The systems engineering process must manage risk, both known and unknown, as well as 
both internal and external.  Risk management will specifically capture and access risk factors and 
their impact, for example, uncontrollable influences such as actions of Congress, changes in fund-
ing, new instructions/policies, changing stakeholders, changing user requirements, or changing 
contractor and government staffing levels.  Case studies can clearly illustrate how risk manage-
ment is executed during actual programs. 
 
Lastly, the systems engineering process must respond to “Mega Trends” in the systems 
engineering discipline itself, as the nature of systems engineering and related practices do vary 
with time.  Case studies can suggest new systems engineering process ideas and, on the other 
hand, serve as reminders of the systems engineering essentials needed to ensure program success. 
 
1.1.3 Framework for Analysis 
 
The systems engineering case studies published by AFIT employ the Friedman-Sage 
framework and matrix as the baseline assessment tool to evaluate the conduct of the systems 
engineering process for the topic program.  The framework and the derived matrix can play an 
important role in developing case studies in systems engineering and systems management, 
especially case studies that involve systems acquisition.  The Friedman-Sage framework is a 
nine-row by three-column matrix shown in Table 1-1. 
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Table 1-1. A Framework of Key Systems Engineering Concepts and Responsibilities 
 Concept Domain Responsibility Domain 
  1. Contractor 
Responsibility 
2. Shared 
Responsibility 
3. Government 
Responsibility 
A. Requirements Definition and   Management    
B. Systems Architecture and Conceptual Design    
C System and Subsystem Detailed Design and 
Implementation 
   
D. Systems Integration and Interface     
E. Validation and Verification    
F. Deployment and Post Deployment     
G. Life Cycle Support    
H.  Risk Assessment and Management     
I. System and Program Management     
 
Six of the nine concept domain areas in Table 1-1 represent phases in the systems engineering 
lifecycle: 
A. Requirements Definition and Management 
B. Systems Architecture and Conceptual Design 
C. Detailed System and Subsystem Design and Implementation 
D. Systems Integration and Interface 
E. Validation and Verification 
F. Deployment and Post-Deployment 
Three of the nine concept areas represent necessary process and systems management support: 
G. Life Cycle Support 
H. Risk Assessment and Management  
I. System and Program Management 
 
While other concepts could have been identified, the Friedman-Sage framework suggests 
these nine are the most relevant to systems engineering, in that they cover the essential life cycle 
processes in the systems engineering acquisition and the systems management support in the 
conduct of the process.  Most other areas that are identified during the development of the matrix 
appear to be subsets of one of these.  The three columns of this two-dimensional framework 
represent the responsibilities and perspectives of government and contractor, and the shared 
responsibilities between the government and the contractor.  In teaching systems engineering in 
DoD, there has previously been little distinction between the duties and responsibilities of the 
government and industry activities.  While the government has the responsibility in all nine 
concept domains, its primary objective is establishing mission requirements. 
 
1.2 GPS Friedman-Sage Matrix 
     
 The Friedman-Sage matrix is used herein retrospectively, as an assessment tool for the 
systems engineering process for the GPS program.  The authors selection of learning principles 
is reflected in the Part 1 Executive Summary of this case. 
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2. SYSTEM DESCRIPTION 
 
2.1 Mission 
 
The Global Positioning System (GPS) is a satellite-based radio navigation system.  It 
provides suitably equipped users the capability to precisely determine three-dimensional position 
and velocity and time information on a global basis (Ref. 12).  The capability was developed to 
provide the United States and DoD with worldwide navigation, position, and timing capabilities 
to support military operations by enhancing ground, sea, and air warfighting efficiencies.  How-
ever, by presidential directive, it was officially made available to the civilian community in 
1983.1 GPS also provides the capability to conduct time transfer for synchronization purposes 
through the use of precise time standards.  GPS supports a secondary mission to provide a highly 
survivable military capability to detect, locate, and report nuclear detonations in the Earth’s 
atmosphere and in near-Earth space in real time.     
 
2.2 Features  
 
“GPS is a highly accurate, passive, all-weather 24-hour, worldwide navigational system 
(Ref. 23).”  Each GPS satellite continuously transmits precise ranging signals at two L-band fre-
quencies: L1 and L2, where L1 = 1575.42 MHz and L2 = 1227.6 MHz. Trilateration is the 
method of determining the relative positions of the user. 
 
GPS provides Nuclear Detonation Detection System (NDS) capability.  With NDS on-
board the satellites, the system can detect nuclear detonation (NUDEC) on or above the surface.   
 
2.3 System Design 
 
GPS consists of three major segments: the Space Vehicle (SV), the User Equipment (UE), 
and the Control Station (CS). 
 
2.3.1 Space Vehicle 
  
The space vehicle segment consists of a system of 24 space-based satellites, of which 
three are spares (see Figure 2-1 for satellite constellation).  The Block II satellites are configured 
in a constellation of six equally spaced orbital planes, inclined at 55 degrees and with four 
satellites in each plane.  The spares are deployed in every other orbital plane.  The satellite 
orbital radius is 26,561.7 km.  Each satellite has a 12-hour orbit.  Precise time is provided by a 
redundant system of rubidium and/or cesium atomic clocks on-board the SV.  
 
Each satellite is capable of continuously transmitting L1 and L2 signals for navigation 
and timing, and L3 signal for nuclear detonation data (see Section 2.3.4 for further details).  It is 
also capable of receiving commands and data from the master control station, and data from 
remote antennas via S-band transmissions.   
 
                                                 
1 GPS was always available to the civilian community.  The GPS JPO worked to make the civilian community a part 
of GPS before the directive was issued.  User charges were in effect for a very short period.  President Reagan’s 
directive for free commercial use of GPS after the Korean aircraft was shot down culminated several ongoing efforts 
to eliminate the charge and make GPS free to the civilian community [25, Scheerer]. 
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Figure 2-1. 24-Spaced-Based Satellite Constellation (Ref. 46) 
 
The satellites transmit timing and navigational data on the two L-band frequencies, L1 
and L2.  Three pseudo-random noise (PRN) ranging codes are in use:  
• The course/acquisition (C/A)-code has a 1.023 MHz chip rate, a period of 1 millisecond 
(ms), and is used primarily to acquire the P-code.  Each satellite has a unique (C/A)-
code. Literature also uses the term “clear/acquisition” for C/A. Both appear acceptable.     
• The precision (P)-code has a 10.23 MHz chipping rate, a period of days, and is the 
principal navigation ranging military code.  
• The (Y)-code is used in place of the (P)-code whenever the anti-spoofing (A-S) mode 
of operation is activated.  Contrary to the (C/A)-code, each satellite has the same (P)-
code, which is almost a year long, but each satellite is assigned a unique (P)-code that 
is reset every seven days.  In this mode, the (P)- and (Y)-code functionality is often 
referred to the P(Y)-code.  Modulated on the above codes is the 50 bps data stream.  P- 
and P(Y)-code are for military use only. 
 
The C/A-code is available on the L1 frequency only; however, future satellite constel-
lations will carry added signals, including a (C/A)-code on L2 and the P-code on both L1 and L2.  
The various satellites all transmit on the same frequencies, L1 and L2, but with individual (C/A)-
code assignments.  The (C/A)-code is available to all civilian users.  
 
Due to the spread spectrum characteristic of the signals, the system provides a large mar-
gin of resistance to interference.  Each satellite transmits a navigation message containing its 
orbital elements, clock behavior, system time, and status messages.  In addition, an almanac is 
also provided, which gives the approximate data for each active satellite.  This allows the user set 
to find all satellites once the first has been acquired.  
 
There are four sets of satellite efforts discussed in this report: The Navigational Tech-
nology Satellites (NTS) launched in Phase I during concept validation phase (Figure 2.2), the 
Block I development satellites (Figure 2-3), the Block II/IIA production satellites (Figure 2.4), 
and the Block IIR (Figure 2-5).  The Block IIF replacement satellites (Figure 2.6) photograph is 
provided for additional information.  
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Figure 2-2.  Navigational Technology Satellite (Ref. 23) 
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Figure 2-3.  Block I GPS Satellite 
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Figure 2-4.  Block IIA GPS Satellite 
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Figure 2-5.  Block IIR GPS Satellite 
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Figure 2-6.  Block IIF GPS Satellite 
 
2.3.2 User Equipment 
 
In general, the user equipment (receiver) compares the time a signal was transmitted by a 
satellite with the time it was received.  The time difference, along with the location of the 
satellites, allows the receiver to determine the user location.  Signals from a minimum of four 
different satellites are required to determine a three-dimensional position.  The user equipment 
(receiver) generally consists of an antenna assembly, receiver, data processor, control/display unit, 
power supply, and interface unit.  There are numerous applications represented by user equip-
ment, including those shown in Figures 2.7 and 2.8. 
 
 
Figure 2-7.  Rockwell Collins Precision Lightweight GPS Receiver (PLGR) (left) and Defense 
Advanced GPS Receiver (DAGR) (right) a later version of the PLGR (Ref. 48, 45) 
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Figure 2-8.  Magellan Marine Receiver (Ref. 46) 
 
2.3.3 Control Segment  
 
The control segment commands, uploads system and control data to, monitors the health 
of, and tracks the space vehicle to validate ephemeris data.  The control segment consists of a 
Master Control Station (MCS) located at Colorado Springs (Schriever AFB); five remote moni-
tor stations which are located in Hawaii, Ascension Island, Diego Garcia, Kwajalein, and Colo-
rado Springs; three ground antennas which are located at Ascension Island, Diego Garcia, and 
Kwajalein; and a Pre-Launch Compatibility Station, which can also function as a ground antenna, 
located at Cape Canaveral AFS.  Figure 3-9 illustrates the elements of the control segment (CS).  
 
The remote monitor stations track each GPS satellite in orbit, monitor the SV’s naviga-
tional signals and health information, and simultaneously relay this information to the MCS.  
Each monitor station has the ability to track up to 11 satellites at once on L1 and L2 signals. 
 
The ground antennas have the capability to upload time corrections and navigation data 
to the satellites (one at a time per ground antenna) via S-band transmissions.  The ground anten-
nas also command the satellites and receive satellite telemetry data.   
 
The ground equipment for receipt of precise time data from a satellite for the US Naval 
Observatory (USNO) is located in the Washington DC area.  There is a backup precise time moni-
toring facility at Schriever AFB [31, Winkler].  USNO monitors the time transfer performance 
and provides data to the MCS on GPS time relative to USNO Coordinated Universal Time 
(UTC).  The MCS is responsible for providing offset information to ensure that the GPS time can 
be maintained within a specified accuracy to UTC when the offset corrections are applied.  Note 
that the SV atomic clocks require periodic updates, as the clocks are only relatively stable.   
 
The ground equipment for receipt of the nuclear detection data via L3 was not the re-
sponsibility of the GPS Joint Program Office.  The GPS control segment was responsible for 
maintaining the required environment for the Integrated Operational Nuclear Detonation 
(NUDET) Detection Systems (IONDS) and the Nuclear Detection System (NDS) sensor. 
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Figure 2-9.  Control Segment (Ref. 42)   
 
2.3.4 Nuclear Detection System (NDS) 
A satellite detecting a NUDET processes the data and crosslinks it to other satellites via 
Ultra-High Frequency (UHF).  All SVs with NUDET data transmit to the NDS User Segment via 
a specific L3 frequency.  The satellites also transmit NUDET data over the Space-Ground Link 
Subsystem (SGLS) operating on S-band.  Figure 2-10 depicts the NDS system segments.  
 
 
 
Figure 2-10.  NDS System Segments (Ref. 49) 
 
2.3.5 “NAVSTAR/GPS” 
 
Dr. Brad Parkinson (Col., ret.) relates the title Global Positioning System “…originated 
with Major General Hank Stelling, who was the Director of Space for the U.S. Air Force DCS 
Research and Development (RDS) in the early 1970s” (Ref. 6).  The title NAVSTAR was suggested 
by Mr. John Walsh, an Associate Director of Defense Development, Research and Engineering 
(DDR&E) who made decisions with respect to the program budget.  Within this report, the term 
“Global Positioning System” or “GPS” will commonly be used.   
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3. GPS PROGRAM EXECUTION 
 
 The GPS program traces it heritage from the early 1960s when Air Force Systems Com-
mand initiated satellite-based navigation systems analysis, conducted by Aerospace Corporation.  
The case study follows the execution of the GPS program from the inception of the idea to the 
Full Operational Capability (FOC) release, 27 Apr 1995.  The discussion will cover the transition 
from concept through development, production, and operational capability release.  The concen-
tration of the case study is not limited to any particular period, and the learning principles come 
from various times throughout the program’s schedule.    
 
 Table 3-1 shows the events and milestones key to the development of the concept, produc-
tion, and the eventual operational capability.  This table will be the reference for keeping dates 
and events in the proper chronological context.  The term “Block” applies to certain phases of 
the program.  These will be discussed in greater detail later in the report.  However, to provide 
insight into the table, the following explanation is provided: 
• Navigational Technology Satellites (NTS): Concept validation phase (also known as Phase I) 
• Block I Satellites, also known as Navigational Development Satellites (NDS): System Veri-
fication phase of GPS Block I in-orbit performance validation (also known as Phase II) 
• Block II/IIA Satellites: Production phase (also known as Phase III) 
• Block IIR Satellites: Replacement operational satellites  
 
3.1 Early Programs 
 
The GPS program evolved as a result of several navigation studies, technology demon-
strations, and operational capabilities.  Some of the key efforts that helped establish potential 
needs, and the technological feasibility to initiate the NAVSTAR/GPS, are briefly discussed to 
provide an appreciation of those efforts and how they affected the systematic approach used by 
the GPS Program.  
 
Sea and air navigation needs during World War II resulted in two systems being devel-
oped: the United Kingdom GEE and the United States Long Range Navigation (LORAN) which 
was developed from the GEE technology.  These were the first navigational systems to use 
multiple radio signals and measure the Doppler Effect (i.e., the difference in the arrival of 
signals), as a means of determining position.  After the Russian Sputnik I launch in 1957, there were 
several efforts looking into space applications.  Soon after the Sputnik I launch, Drs. Geier and 
Weiffenbach at John Hopkins University Applied Research Laboratory (ARL) conducted a study 
of the Sputnik space-generated signals.  The study concluded that a complete set of orbit 
parameters for a near-earth satellite could be inferred to useful accuracy from a single set of 
Doppler shift data (single pass from horizon to horizon).  Applying “the inverse problem” 
(knowing the orbit), the ground location could be predicted.  ARL was aware of the Navy’s need 
to precisely determine the location of Polaris submarines as an initial condition for Polaris 
launch.  After discussions with the Navy, ARL submitted a proposal to the Navy in 1958 for the 
TRANSIT Navigational System based upon the technical effort on orbit ephemeredes algorithms 
they devolved.  Out of this effort, the Polaris program provided initial sponsorship. 
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Table 3-1.  Major Events in Navigation and GPS Events/Milestones 
 
Mar 1942 British GEE System became operational 
1941 – 1943 Long Range Navigation (LORAN) developed and operationally implemented 
1957 Demonstration of establishing satellite ephemeris through measurement of Doppler shift by Applied Research Laboratory (Ref. 8) 
13 April 
1960 First navigation satellite TRANSIT launched by the Navy 
1963 Air Force Project 621B established 
5 Dec 1963 First operational TRANSIT satellite launched 
1964 TIMATION begins development under Roger Easton at the Naval Research Laboratory 
1967 First TIMATION satellite launched by Navy 
1967 TRANSIT fully operational 
1968 Navigation Satellite Executive Group (NAVSEG) established among three services  within DoD 
31 Aug 1971 DoD Directive listed and confirmed US Naval Observatory for establishing, coordinating, and maintaining time and time interval 
19 Jun 1972  Defense Navigation Satellite System Program (DNSSP) Management Directive signed (later evolved into GPS Program) 
13 Dec 1973 Defense System Acquisition and Review Board (DSARC) approval to proceed with the GPS program 
8 Aug 1974 Block I Satellite Contract Award to Rockwell International 
Sep 1974 Block I User Equipments and Ground Station Contract Award to General Dynamics 
14 Jul 1974 Navigational Technology Satellite (NTS) I (a refurbished TIMATION II) satellite with first atomic clock (two Rubidium Clocks) launched 
June 1975 Contract Award to Texas Instruments for Manpack & Aircraft Receivers 
22 Feb 1978 First Block I Navigation Development Satellite (NDS) is launched 
5 Jun 1979 DSARC II approval to proceed into Full Scale Development (FSD) 
Fall 1979 Decision from the Pentagon to cut constellation from 24 to 18 due to DoD funding cutback 
26 Apr 1980 First GPS satellite to carry the Integrated Operational Nuclear Detection System (IONDS) launched 
16 Sept 1983 President Reagan directs GPS become available to civilian community at a no-charge basis 
May 1983 Block II satellite contract award to Rockwell International 
April 1985 First GPS user equipment production contract 
Oct 1985 Seventh and last Block I satellite launched 
28 Jan 1986 Space Shuttle Challenger accident 
Jun 1986 DSARC IIIA approved to proceed into production  
14 Feb 1989 First Block II production satellite launched 
21 Jun 1989 Block IIR Satellite contract award to GE Astro Space division 
26 Nov 1990 Selective Availability activated per Federal Radio Navigation Plan 
26 Nov 1990 First Block IIA production satellite with Nuclear Detection Systems capability launched 
8 Dec 1993 Secretary of Defense declares NAVSTAR GPS Initial Operation Capability (IOC) with a constellation of Block I/II/IIA satellites 
27 Apr 1995 HQ Air Force Space Command declares GPS fully operational with Block II/IIA satellites 
29 Mar 1996 Presidential Policy on GPS – discontinue Selective Availability within a decade 
31 Dec 1996 Navy terminates TRANSIT operations 
6 Nov 1997 Last block IIA satellite launched 
23 July 1997 First successful Block IIR satellite launch 
1 May 2000 Selective Availability function discontinued 
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The Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) became the formal sponsor of the pro-
gram later in 1958, supported by the Navy’s Strategic System Program Office.  Dr. Richard 
Kirschner managed the APL program.  The operational configuration was six satellites in polar 
orbit at approximately 600 nautical miles.  Satellite ephemeris was broadcasted, and the provided 
navigational solution was two-dimensional.  Additionally, the receiver had to know its own 
altitude and correct for platform velocity.  Consequently, this system was not suited for aircraft 
applications.  Navigational accuracy was approximately 100-meter Circular Error Probable 
(CEP).  Even though the system was designed for a two- to three-year life, some of the systems 
attained up to 16 years of service.  This system became available to the civilian community in 
1967.  “TRANSIT pioneered many areas of space technology, including stabilization systems, 
advancing time and frequency standards, multiple spacecraft launchings, and the first electronic 
memory computer in space” (Ref. 10).  Near- and real-time orbit prediction, led by Messrs. Hill 
and Anderle of the Naval Surface Weapons Center (NSWC), was a key technology that 
TRANSIT matured that was valuable to the GPS [17, Parkinson]. 
  
Aerospace Corporation was conducting studies looking into military applications, most 
being space-based concepts.  One of these studies, Project 57, encompassed the use of satellites 
for improving navigation for fast-moving vehicles in three dimensions.  It was “in this study that 
the concept for GPS was born” (Ref. 8).  The Air Force encouraged Aerospace Corp. to continue 
these studies stipulating that “…it had to be a true navigational system…unlimited number of 
users…providing global coverage…sufficiently accurate to meet military needs…”  (Ref. 8).  This 
project eventually became Air Force Project 621B established in 1963, which continued to 
evolve the concept.  A key systems engineering report, in annotated briefing form, was 
constructed in 1963-1964 and is included in Appendix 5.  This report summarizes the early GPS 
concept for the orbits and the signal structure.  The trade studies conducted by Aerospace at the 
time showed a concept that provided a high-dynamic capability using two pseudorandom noise 
signals would allow use by high-performance aircraft, as well as all the other vehicles requiring 
navigation information.  The signal could be detected by users at levels less than 1/100th of 
ambient noise.  This was accomplished using the spread spectrum concept, which was in its 
infancy at the time.  This technique rejected noise and, thereby, had some inherent anti-jam 
capability.  The concept relied on continuous measurement from the ground for signal 
synchronization and included a system of “…four separate satellite constellations, each served 
by an independent ground-control station, at least two of which would have to be located outside 
of the United States, (and) was not acceptable from a survivability standpoint” (Ref. 24).  Time 
was transmitted from the ground to the satellites.  The project successfully demonstrated satellite 
ranging based upon pseudorandom noise signals.  Testing was conducted at Holloman 
AFB/White Sands Missile Range (WSMR) in early 1972 using simulated transmitters on the 
desert floor and in balloons.  Aircraft accuracy was demonstrated to be less than 5 m for position 
and less than 0.3 m/sec for velocity.  During this time, signal definition studies were being 
conducted with Magnavox Research Lab and Philco-Ford Corp. Magnavox Hazeltine and 
Aerospace Corporation provided significant efforts that led to the jam-resistant passive ranging 
signal (CDMA Spread spectrum–Pseudo-random noise) [17, Parkinson]. 
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Roger Easton, Navy Research Laboratory (NRL), “formulated a concept in April 1964 
for transmitted ranging signals along with primary CW signal, such that the distance to the target 
satellite could be passively measured…” (Ref. 23).  This concept led to the initiation of the 
Navy’s TIMATION program and “…under the direction of Roger Easton, (the project) concen-
trated on developing an improved quartz frequency standard for satellites and determining the 
most effective satellite constellation for providing worldwide coverage” (Ref. 23).  The concept 
proposed was to advance the development of high-stability clocks, time transfer capability and 
three-dimensional navigation, and to determine the most effective satellite configuration for 
global coverage.  Side-tone range signals were transmitted from the satellite and space-borne 
clocks would be updated by a master clock on the ground.  TIMATION utilized clocks on-board 
the satellite that were derived from stable crystal oscillators (Ref. 23).  The baseline signal struc-
ture would require different frequencies when multiple satellites were transmitting. The two 
TIMATION satellites launched under this program were at a 500 nautical mile polar orbit. These 
initial satellites validated the feasibility of time transfer from the satellite at several worldwide 
locations.   
 
In order to minimize updates required to space-borne atomic clocks, NRL pursued a 
change to the international time standard.  “Since the satellite navigation was going to be an 
expected major and critical user of Precise Time, the NRL (Roger Easton)…urged USNO (Dr. 
Winkler) to work for a change in the timekeeping adjustment procedures.  This was 
accomplished due in part to several other initiatives including Dr Winkler’s…with adoption of 
the new Coordinated Universal Time (UTC) system by the responsible coordinating international 
bodies, the CCIR (Comité Consultatif International des Radio Communications), the ITU 
(International Telecommunications Union), the IAU (International Astronomical Union), and the 
CIPM (International Conference for Weights and Measures)… effective 1970.  The new UTC 
system with very infrequent leap seconds and a fixed frequency avoided (important particularly 
for space applications) the small frequency adjustments used then to keep the Atomic clock time 
(UTC) in close agreement (<0.9s) with earth time (UT1)” (Ref. 34).  
 
Deputy Secretary Packard2issued DoD Directive 5160.51 on 31 August 1971, re-
emphasizing the designation of the USNO as the responsible agency for ensuring “uniformity in 
precise time and time interval operations including measurements…” and “…for establishment 
of overall DoD requirements for time and time interval” (Ref. 24).  
 
The Army was also interested in satellite navigation systems.  “The U.S. Army developed 
the SECOR (Sequential Collation of Range) system and the first SECOR transponder was orbited 
on ANNA-1B in 1962.  The SECOR system continued in use through 1970.  The system 
operated on the principle that an electromagnetic wave propagated through space undergoes a 
phase shift proportional to the distance traveled.  A ground station transmitted a phase-modulated 
signal, which was received by the satellite-borne transponder and returned to the ground.  The 
phase shift experienced by the signal during the round trip from ground to satellite and back to 
ground was measured electronically at the ground station, which provided as its output a 
digitized representation of range” (Ref. 25).  Thirteen satellites were launched between 1964 and 
1969.  
 
                                                 
2 Honorable David Packard was Deputy Secretary of Defense from 1969 to 1971. 
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In 1968, the Joint Chief of Staff (JCS) directed an effort to develop concepts of a three-
dimensional, global, continuous navigational system.  This effort resulted in the establishment of 
the Navigation Satellite Executive Steering Group (NAVSEG) [1, Beard].  It was “…chartered to 
determine the feasibility and the practicality of a space-based navigation system for improving 
military navigation and positioning” (Ref. 26).  NAVSEG contracted a number of studies to fine 
tune the basic navigation concepts.  These included choice of frequency (L-band vs. C-band), design 
of signal structure, atomic clock development, and selection of satellite concept configuration.  
They also managed concept debates in which ARL pushed for expanded TRANSIT, NRL for 
expanded TIMATION, and the Air Force pushed for synchronous orbits with pseudorandom 
noise signals (Ref. 27).  The Naval Weapons Lab-Dahlgren (now the Naval Surface Weapons 
Center-Dahlgren) conducted significant studies in tracking and orbit predictions.  All the major 
navigational studies sponsored by the NAVSEG from 1968 through 1972 were classified.  The 
original concept plan, which was later modified with the establishment of a joint program office, 
was to have a demonstration of each proposed navigational concept being developed by the 
services to evaluate their capabilities.  [1, Beard]. 
 
No defined operational need among the services drove the development of a space-based 
navigation system to improve air, land, or sea navigation and position accuracy, other than the 
Navy’s requirement. Recall this requirement was for precise location of their nuclear submarines 
used for missile launch that was being fulfilled by the TRANSIT system.  The TRANSIT, 
originally intended for submarines, was beginning to be used by commercial marine navigators.  
Each service was individually exploring technology efforts for navigational improvements with 
space-based satellite concepts. 
 
In May 1972, the Secretary of the Air Force endorsed a draft Concept Development Paper 
to the Director, Defense Research and Engineering (DDR&E).  The paper described an “opera-
tional feasibility demonstration program using a constellation of repeater satellites” (Ref. 12).  
Decisions had previously been made that a joint test program would be conducted using a 
pseudo-random noise generator developed under Air Force funding onboard the TIMATION III 
satellite to be launched in late 1973, actually launched in 1974 as Navigation Technology Satel-
lite (NTS) I.  
 
A Program Management Directive (PMD) for a Satellite System for Precise Navigation 
was issued by HQ USAF Deputy Director of Space, DCS/Research and Development on 19 July 
1972.  The purpose of the PMD was for Air Force Systems Command (AFSC) “…to define and 
configure a satellite-based positioning system…(to) provide suitably equipped users the capability to 
determine three dimensional position and velocity, and time information on a global basis” (Ref. 12).  
The PMD also directed an initial demonstration of the operational feasibility of a global posi-
tioning system with the intent to verify the system technical concepts such as accuracy, availability, 
signal structure, and satellite tracking.  A six-year (FY73-78), $148M projected program was identi-
fied in the PMD.  Magnavox Research Laboratories and Philco-Ford Corporation were already 
conducting studies on signal structure candidates and TRW was investigating user equipment 
receiver configurations, requirements, and costs based upon previous HQ USAF direction. 
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3.2 Establishment of a Joint Program  
 
Deputy Secretary of Defense Packard was concerned about the proliferation of programs 
being individually pursued by the services within DoD.  He advocated joint efforts where similar or 
parallel efforts were being addressed among the services.  He took action to combine service 
activities with a lead service being designated to reduce development, production, and logistics 
costs.  There was a proliferation of navigation systems by the individual services and the 
individual weapons systems with unique navigation systems.  The practically independent effort of 
the three services to develop and enhance spaced-based navigation systems became an excellent 
candidate for a joint program.  DoD directed that the spaced-based navigation efforts by the three 
services would become a joint program.  The Air Force was directed to be the lead with multi-
service participation.  The Joint Program Office (JPO) was to be located at the Space and Missile 
System Organization (SAMSO) at Los Angeles Air Station.3 
 
Col. Brad Parkinson was designated the program director.  The JPO was manned with a 
Deputy Program Managers from the Air Force, the Army, the Navy, Defense Mapping Agency, 
the Marine Corps, and the Coast Guard.  Col. Parkinson added a strong base of technical experts 
in the appropriate functions for space, navigation systems, Kalman Filters, signal structure, signal 
generation, electronics, and testing.  Aerospace Corporation continued to provide valuable 
technical and systems engineering analysis to the JPO as it had during Project 621B.  Eventually, 
there would be representatives from Strategic Air Command (SAC), NATO, and other 
international organizations in the JPO.   
 
Soon after the establishment of the JPO, the first major task was to obtain approval for the 
program.  The JPO structured a program that closely resembled the Air Force 621B system.  This 
program was presented to the Defense System Acquisition and Review Council (DSARC) in late 
August 1973 to gain approval to proceed into the concept/validation phase.  “Dr. Malcolm Currie, 
then head of DDR&E4, expressed strong support for the idea of a new satellite-based navigation 
system, but requested that the concept be broadened to embrace the views and requirements of 
all services” (Ref. 12).  DoD viewed the viability of the program based upon two overriding issues: 
1. Should a universal, precise positioning and navigation system be initiated?  This question 
reduces down to two sub-questions: Will a universal system permit a significant reduction in 
the total DoD cost for positioning and navigation?  Will military effectiveness be 
significantly increased by a universal system? 
2. What is the best program orientation and pace for achieving the desired capability?      
 
A universal navigation system could replace a significant portion of the current and planned 
navigation and positioning equipment such as LORAN, TRANSIT, VOR, OMEGA, DOPPLER, 
RADAR, range instrumentation, geodetic equipment, LRPDS, and ILS Approval.  The Office of 
Secretary of Defense (OSD) estimated that cumulative expenditure of funds from 1973 to the 
mid-1980s for operations and maintenance of these facilities ranged from $7.5 B to $12.5 B.  
However, approval for the program to proceed was not obtained and the near-term task ahead 
was clearly defined to develop a joint technical program. 
                                                 
3 This decision was most likely based upon the Air Force having been identified by DoD in the past as the lead 
service in operational space systems. 
4 Dr. Malcolm Currie was Director DDR&E from 1973 to 1977. 
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Col. Parkinson assembled approximately 12 JPO members at the Pentagon over the 1973 
Labor Day weekend and tasked the team to develop a program that would utilize the best of all 
services’ concepts and technologies.  The technology up to that time frame had advanced: 1) 
space system reliability through the TRANSIT program; 2) the stability of atomic clocks and 
quartz crystal oscillator through NRL efforts and the TIMATION program; 3) the precise 
ephemeris tracking and algorithms prediction from APL/NRL/TIMATION, Project 621B, and 
the Navy Surface Weapons Center; 4) the spread spectrum signal structure primarily from 
Project 621B; and 5) the large-scale integrated circuits in a general industry-wide effort.  
Reliability of satellites and large-scale integrated circuits had been proven.  The resultant pro-
gram was a synthesis of the best from each service’s programs.  This culminated in formulating 
an integrated program that assessed the viability of mixing these new and emerging technologies.  
As Dr. Parkinson said, “Rarely, however, have so many seemingly unrelated technical advances 
occurred almost simultaneously that would permit a complex system like GPS to become a 
reality” (Ref. 22)?  The revised program went through a series of briefings to key decision 
makers prior to reconvening the DSARC I.  The DSARC I was held on 13 Dec 1973 and 
approval was granted to proceed with the program into a concept development phase.  The 
funding line of $148M for the new program was established, allowing NRL to continue with the 
TIMATION work, especially to develop and mature the atomic clock.  The 621B funding line 
disappeared.  It is interesting to note the relative accuracy with which the Aerospace Corporation 
study assessed cost for similar types of technology implementation.  Chart No. 75 in Appendix 5 
shows a $111M prediction in FY64 dollars for the early concept, compared with $148M in 1973 
for the integrated service approach. 
 
At this time, there was neither operating command support nor any operational mission 
need nor Concept of Operations, and no advocacy for this effort.  Additionally, there was some 
negative feedback from operational commands that preferred funding to be spent on weapon 
systems [17, Parkinson; 11, Green].  DoD began taking on the role of customer/user.  They were 
also becoming the advocates for the program – especially the Director of DDR&E, Dr. Malcolm 
Currie – and were shaping the approach to the effort, including approval and control of 
performance requirements, and ensuring that the services were providing support in terms of 
funding [5, Currie].   
 
The expected performance of the GPS was delineated in the approved Concept Devel-
opment Plan signed by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, 11 May 1974, as shown in Table 3-2.  
 
Table 3-2. Expected GPS Performance (Ref. 13) 
Characteristic Performance 
Accuracy (relative and repeatable) 5-20m (1 sigma) 
Accuracy (predictable) 15-30m (1 sigma) 
Dimensions 3-D + time, 3-D velocity 
Time to acquire a fix Real Time (for stated accuracies) 
Fix Availability Continuous 
Coverage Global 
 
In addition to this performance, the system was to have the following additional charac-
teristics (Ref. 13): 
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1. Passive operations for all users 
2. Be deniable to enemy 
3. No saturation limit 
4. Resistance to countermeasures, nuclear radiation and natural phenomenon 
5. Common coordinate reference 
6. Available for common use by all services and allies 
7. Accuracy not degraded by changes in user altitudes  
 
The program consisted of a three-phase approach:  
Phase I – Concept/Validation 
Phase II – Full-Scale Engineering Development 
Phase III – Production 
 
The program estimated a limited Initial Operational Capability (IOC) could be obtained 
in 1981 and a Full Operational Capability (FOC) in 1984.  The program was baselined against 
those scheduled events.    
 
The completion of each phase would require DSARC approval before proceeding into the 
next phase, which was typical of all major DoD programs.  The overall program planned initial 
schedule is in shown Figure 3-1.  The basic tenet of this schedule, the three-phase approach, re-
mained constant through the program.  The specifics would change due to funding issues, tech-
nical issues, and other extraneous events that would impact the program.  These specific issues 
will be addressed throughout this report.   
 
Figure 3-1.  Program Schedule (Ref. 13)5
                                                 
5 The “2x2”, “3x3”, and “3x8” are the planned constellation configurations where the first number is the number of 
planes and the second number is the number of SVs per plane.  Only two of the three NTS SVs would be launched 
in the first phase of the program.   
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The unique needs of the program efforts and the systems engineering process varied 
during the three phases.  In all phases, the JPO provided the leadership and focus of the effort 
and maintained the overall control and management of the systems requirements.  The contractor 
teams and government team worked in close collaboration and mutual support to achieve the 
initial vision of “five bombs in the same hole” at a reasonable cost.   
 
3.3 Concept/Validation Phase (Phase I) 
   
3.3.1 Objectives 
 
The objectives of the concept/validation phase were to prove the validity of integrating 
the selected technologies, define system-level requirements and architecture, initiate user equip-
ment development, and demonstrate operational utility.  The tenets of the systems engineering 
process would play a key role meeting the specific two objectives. 
 
The first objective was to determine preferred UE designs and validate life cycle cost models in 
the design-to-cost process.  Six classes of UE were to be considered (Table 3.3).  The guidance 
on the UE design was to incorporate a high degree of commonality among the classes through 
the use of modular designs.  Sufficient quantities of UE models were to be procured to support a 
comprehensive Developmental Test and Evaluation (DT&E) (Ref. 13).  
 
Table 3-3.  Proposed Classes of User Equipment (Ref. 13) 
 
A B C D E F 
High Accuracy** 
 
 
High dynamics of 
 user 
 
High immunity to 
jamming 
Medium accuracy* 
 
 
High dynamic of 
user 
 
Medium immunity 
to jamming 
Medium Accuracy 
 
 
Medium dynamics 
of user 
 
Immunity to 
unintentional EMI 
 
Low Cost 
High Accuracy 
 
 
Low dynamics of 
user 
 
High immunity to 
jamming 
High Accuracy 
 
 
Low dynamics of 
user 
 
High immunity to 
jamming 
Medium accuracy 
 
 
Low dynamics     
of user 
 
Medium immunity 
to jamming 
CANDIDATE MISSIONS 
AIR FORCE 
Strategic aircraft 
 
Photo 
Reconnaissance 
ARMY 
Helicopter 
 
USMC 
Close air support 
Helicopter 
 
NAVY 
Close air support 
Attack aircraft 
 
AIR FORCE 
Interdiction 
Close air support 
 
ARMY 
Mission support 
 
NAVY 
Mission support 
Surface vehicles 
ASW aircraft 
 
AIR FORCE 
Airlift 
Search & Rescue 
Mission support 
ARMY 
Wheeled and track 
vehicle 
 
NAVY 
Mine warfare 
ARMY 
Man backpack 
 
USMC 
Man backpack 
NAVY 
Submarine 
 
Note: The above classes of User Equipment and Candidate missions will be refined during Phase I 
** High accuracy better than 50 ft 
*   Medium accuracy 50-500 ft 
+  Acceptable accuracy as determined by cost tradeoffs 
 
 28
The second objective was to conduct limited demonstrations of operational utility.   These 
demonstrations were to focus on coordinated bombing, terminal navigation, landing 
approaches, airborne refueling, Army land operations, special operational techniques for anti-
jamming margins, and system vulnerability.  This objective would also investigate satellite 
hardening, long-term stability of rubidium frequency standards, and provide navigation signals 
compatible between technology and development satellites.  Experiments would continue to 
space qualify advanced frequency standards.  Lastly, a prototype ground station would be 
developed and tested.  
 
3.3.2 Requirements  
 
Some basic requirements were identified in the Concept Development Paper (Ref 13).  
There was no Concept of Operations (CONOPS) or defined military need for this space-based 
navigation system.  Col. Parkinson believed that the JPO would be responsible for developing 
initial CONOPS and military utilization through the technology and operational demonstration 
and development effort.  He established a vision of two “key performance requirements” for this 
phase.  The first was the capability to demonstrate “drop five bombs in the same hole.”  This 
“key parameter” embodied the integration of receivers on platforms and the capability to 
transmit precise space-based navigation and timing data.  A demonstration would provide hard 
data to gain support for the military utility of the system.  Accordingly, he needed to have the 
appropriate operational people observe the demonstration and review the data in order to gain 
their acknowledgement of the improved capability [17, Parkinson].  
 
The second “key parameter” in his vision was the ability to build a receiver for less than 
$10,000.  This complemented the first key parameter in demonstrating the affordability of this 
navigational improvement.   
 
The Government foresaw the need to have the civilian community participate in the pro-
gram.  The civilian community had resources to insert new technology and drive down the costs 
in their competitive environment to the benefit of DoD and the JPO [25, Scheerer].  At this time, 
no one foresaw how far the civilian community usage of the “in-the-clear” GPS capability would 
drive down the military cost of the user equipment – down to the $1000-$1500 range for some 
units.  Some commercial GPS receivers can now be purchased for less than $100 [8, Fruehauf].  
One additional benefit of civilian community involvement was the political support provided to 
keep the program going [25, Scheerer]. 
 
In the early phases of GPS, the program is better viewed as a monolithic system with the 
JPO controlling all parts:  space, ground, and user.  As the program progresses, control 
dissipates.  Commercial providers of the user equipment interject a strong influence.  This 
diffusion of control becomes more evident as the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Coast 
Guard, and eventually the Galileo European Global Navigation System started providing 
independent signaling elements.  The JPO’s ability and means to effectively conduct systems 
engineering dramatically changed as their control diffused.  As is typical in a SoS environment, 
the JPO’s role becomes more as an integrator/collaborator than a developer.   
 
An important feature of systems engineering was the JPO view of top-level requirements.  
Requirements were “negotiable”, i.e. tradable, which was a significant benefit that allowed the 
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evolution and development of the program as knowledge and technology advanced with time.  
The philosophy was to understand the risk to change versus the risk to stay on the same course.  
The corollary to this premise was to maximize the number of negotiable requirements.  Finally, it 
was important to communicate requirements to customers (operational users and DoD).  This 
program’s systems engineering philosophy would allow appropriate trades to be conducted to 
optimize the military utility/operational concept, cost, schedule, risk, and performance/design, as 
well as gain necessary support of the user.   
 
The Phase I System Specification defined the system error budget, the system-level 
functional flow diagram and interfaces, constellation support in terms of control segment, upload 
station performance characteristics, the classes of user equipment, the signal structure to be used, 
and the required software standard.  Since the GPS was “a system of systems”6 not connected by 
hardware, other system-level physical characteristic requirements – such as reliability and 
maintainability, design and construction, human factors, logistics, as well as personnel and 
training, were deferred to the system segment specifications.  There was no system verification 
section.  For this phase, a fourth segment or element of the system was defined as the navigation 
technology segment to address the NTS, the NRL telemetry, tracking and control segment, and 
the PRN navigation assembly.  Figure 3-2 defines the Phase I system interfaces.   
 
 
Figure 3-2.  System Interfaces (Ref. 28) 
   
The development of the SV performance requirements was a rigorous joint development 
effort with the JPO and the bidders prior to the Request for Proposal (RFP) being released.  “The 
Air Force…clearly spelled out the requirements for the satellite.  The requirements did not change 
during the Phase I program which allowed the team to build and test hardware and not constantly 
change it,” said Dick Schwartz, Rockwell Block I Program Manager.  Rockwell took the detailed 
                                                 
6 There are various definitions of “System of Systems”.  In this report, the authors determined that the GPS was a Sys-
tem of Systems for the following reason: There were three major system segments (SV, CS, UE) that were developed 
by separate contracts and physically independent with only the interface of signals as the “string” that tied them to-
gether.  Each segment was considered a system composed of various subsystems that were being developed to meet 
the segment system performance.  Each of the three “Systems’ combined to provide a system navigational capability. 
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requirements for each SV subsystem and wrote detailed subcontractor specifications for fixed-
price subcontractor bids.  The JPO added no additional requirements to this phase of the program.  
From contract award to launch in 3½ years, there were only two small configuration changes to 
the satellite.  The main focus was on building the configuration that was developed in the year 
before the contract award [26, Schwartz].  
 
3.3.3 Acquisition Strategy 
 
The JPO was organizationally set up with three major branches/groups with respect to the 
segments of the system: space vehicle (SV), control segment (CS), and user equipment (UE).  
The systems engineering group owned the system-level configuration and interface control 
processes.  Col. Parkinson determined that the JPO would be responsible for system integration 
to the initial concern of Aerospace Corporation and contractors.  Managing the interfaces and 
retaining control of the system specification was an essential and critically important strategy for 
Col. Parkinson and the JPO.  He believed that, “Unless I was at the center of the systems 
engineering involved here, I didn't think I could pull it off either, because the contractors quickly 
close you out of the essential decisions here.  Making the trades would be left to them on what-
ever motivation they had” (Ref. 21).  He had difficulty convincing his own management, Gen. 
Schultz at Space and Missile Systems Office (SAMSO), which eventually became Space 
Division.  Finally, he convinced him that the system was defined by signal structure in space and 
not by physical interfaces [17, Parkinson].  
 
The acquisition strategy was to issue separate contracts for each segment.  The Develop-
ment Concept Paper scoped the approach to contracting: “Since the vast majority of the technol-
ogy for GPS is well in hand, fixed price multiple incentive contracts will be used where possible” 
(Ref. 13).  However, the initial UE development would be cost-plus-incentive fee contracts due 
to the risk in the development of a low-cost, lightweight receiver.   
 
The basic costing tenet from the services was that the Army and Navy funded unique UE 
and service-peculiar testing, the Navy funded NTS and testing, and the Air Force funded NDS, 
testing, and Air Force UE.  The Air Force funded the CS and SV segments efforts.   
 
There were six principal contractors for this phase which are shown in Table 3-4:  
 
Table 3-4.  Phase I Major Contractors (Ref. 4) 
 
Contractor Responsibility 
Rockwell International (RI)  Development satellites 
General Dynamics Control segment and direction to Magnavox 
Magnavox User Equipment 
Texas Instrument (TI) User Equipment (alternate source) 
Stanford Telecommunications Inc.  Signal Structure 
Rockwell Collins (actually under contract 
to Air Force Avionics Laboratory) 
User Equipment (General Development Model (GDM) 
sponsored by the Air Force Avionics Lab. GDM also 
used to evaluate anti-jam system techniques)  
 
Rockwell International, Seal Beach CA, was awarded a fixed-price incentive fee with an 
Award Fee contract in Jun 1974 for four Block I satellites, one of which was the refurbished quali-
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fication model.  The contract (F04701-C-74-0527) was modified and additional satellites were 
purchased for a total of eight satellites (see paragraph 3.3.7 for additional insight as to the need 
for the additional satellites).  In 1979, four replenishment satellites would be purchased under a 
separate contract (F04701-C-79-0153).  The last Block I satellite (SV) was converted to a Block 
II qualification test vehicle under an engineering change proposal [21, Reaser]. 
 
In September 1974, the JPO awarded General Dynamics a contract to supply UE 
receivers and develop the prototype ground control system.  Additionally, this cost-plus-incentive 
fee (CPIF) contract was to supply 40 models of seven different classes of receivers: bombers, 
helicopters/fighters, transport aircraft, tanks/ships, manpack, submarines, and missiles.  
Magnavox was the major subcontractor for the user equipment.  Litton Industries Mellonics, and 
Litton G&C Systems Division were major subcontractors providing supporting software for the 
ground control segment and instrument test equipment.  Texas Instruments was awarded a fixed-
price contract for development of a manpack receiver, computer equipment, and a pair of high-
performance aircraft receivers.  Rockwell Collins was on contract to the Air Force Avionics 
Laboratory to evaluate space-based navigational signals and the concept of high anti-jam 
receivers via a General Development Model (GDM), shown in Figure 3-3. 
  
 
Figure 3-3.  Rockwell Collins GDM (Ref. 47) 
 
The DoD, realizing the strong potential for commercial application and foreseeing the 
benefits of more competition, announced that those who developed receivers with their own funds 
could have their system evaluated and certified by the JPO. 
 
The contractors accomplished some unique systems engineering approaches.  “As a 
contractor (Rockwell International) we took those requirements and during the pre-proposal and 
proposal phase...built hardware to demonstrate the critical spacecraft technologies.  We were 
able to include test data on real hardware in the proposal.”  Rockwell built and tested hardware, 
such as atomic clocks, navigation band high-power amplifiers, and antennas during the proposal 
phase.  “We had a complete design for the satellite backed up by test data that was submitted as 
part of the proposal” [26, Schwartz]. 
 
The SV contract type was a fixed-price incentive with a 125% ceiling and an 80%/ 20% 
share between the target and ceiling.  The contract also included a $100K threshold change 
clause (no changes under $100K) with a manpower provision for studies [11, Green].  The 125% 
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ceiling provided a margin for problem resolution and the share line provided the motivation to 
minimize cost.  The Award Fee program evaluated management performance.  “My view was 
that the AF had excellent people and suggestions because they viewed the program from an 
overall perspective, and the comments were constructive” [26, Schwartz]. 
 
There were also on-orbit incentives in the SV contract.  These were daily incentives for 
satellite performance in orbit where the navigation signal was measured at the CS Signal struc-
ture, and strength was measured from when the satellite rose 5 degrees above the horizon until it 
set 5 degrees above the horizon [26, Schwartz]. 
    
Rockwell established a dedicated project organization with personnel co-located next to 
the spacecraft assembly and test area.  These technical personnel were handpicked by the GPS 
program manager.  An engineer managed each subsystem and was responsible for the subsystem 
design, the interface with other systems, management of subcontractors, overseeing the 
fabrication of parts, development of test procedures, and the conduct of testing [26, Schwartz]. 
 
Aerospace Corporation provided technical experience from all of the Air Force satellite 
programs.  Irv Rezpnick, the Senior Aerospace manager, provided support developing the SV test 
programs, subcontractor reviews, and high reliability parts program [26, Schwartz]. 
 
3.3.4 Trade Studies  
 
General Dynamics conducted a major set of trade early in Phase I (July 1974), to provide 
recommendations on several key program decisions required in this phase (Ref. 19).  These trade 
studies are depicted in Table 3-5.  
 
The trade studies below considered the impact on the next phases of the program.  With 
respect to the orbit portion of the study, the program baseline of 4-satellite constellations was 
assessed.  Paragraph 3.3.7 below discusses the need for spare satellites, which drove a change to 
the configuration.  These studies provided preliminary allocated baselines to the control segment 
and the UE during this initial phase of the program.  As concept validation testing continued and 
the designs matured, final baseline allocation would be established as the program moved into 
the next phase.  The CS consisted of three main configuration items: the master control station, 
the monitoring station, and the upload station.  
 
Table 3-5.  General Dynamics Phase I Trade Studies (Ref. 19) 
Trade Study Selection 
Satellite Memory Loading Resolve the method for uploading user-required data and verifying accuracy after SV has received it.  S-band uplink and L-band downlink, verified at SV  
Satellite Orbit  Resulted in a 2/2/0 configuration 
Monitor Station Sites Selection: Hawaii, VAFB, Elmendorf AFB & TBD; VAFB to be MCS and Upload Station 
Control Segment Computers Evaluation criteria established 
User Segment Computer Interim findings only…did not consider on Phases II/III  
User Cost/Performance Low fidelity study, some cost/performance data; no selection 
User Ionosphere Model Identified important features: user storage, satellite transmission & technique accuracy 
User Ephemeris Model Kepler functional model, functional ephemeris  
Ephemeris Determination   
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In conjunction with Aerospace Corporation, the JPO conducted various analyses and trade 
studies on operational constellation concepts that resulted in a baseline configuration of eight 
satellites, each in three circular rings with 63-degree inclinations.  Major considerations were the 
global coverage, satellite replacement issues, and the location of the remote sites.  Figure 3-4 was 
the early planned constellation approach of constellation arrangement as the number of satellites 
in orbit increased.  The consensus was that a trade study should be conducted to determine a 
higher SV orbit, as it would reduce the number of satellites required.  However, the Atlas rocket 
with stage vehicle that was developed could only support the 1000 lb SV to the 12-hour orbit.  It 
turned out that this orbit configuration was adequate to support the testing at Yuma Proving 
Grounds (YPG) with a limited constellation [11, Green].  As the program progressed, external 
events would require the JPO and Aerospace Corporation to conduct a trade analysis of the 
constellation configuration and modify the functional baseline. 
 
 
 
Figure 3-4.  Planned Constellation Development before 1974. Proof of Concept has 6 Block I 
satellites in 2 planes. Build up to 24 Block II satellites in 3 planes (Ref. 18) 
 
The PRN signal structure is the key enabling technology of GPS, resulting from extensive sys-
tems engineering analysis and trade studies dating back to the early Aerospace studies sponsored 
by AFSC/SMC (Appendix 5).  The whole structure of the system revolved around the ability to 
communicate accurate navigation and timing data to each of the segments.  Extensive signal and 
communications message development trade studies that bridged from Project 621B to this phase 
were conducted.  The Project 621B study system employed signal modulation and used a repeated 
digital sequence of random bits.  The sequences of bits were simple to generate by using a shift 
register, or by simply storing the entire bit sequence if the code was sufficiently short.  The 
sensing equipment detected the start phase of the repeater sequence and used this information to 
determine the range to a satellite.  The concept of PRN ranging was led by Aerospace Corpo-
ration and Magnavox.  Dr. Charles Cahn was a signal analyst who, with Dr. Robert Gold, was 
involved in the development of the signal architecture [28, Stansell].  The first receivers 
developed for PRN ranging were Magnavox Hazeltine.  The signal structure was defined by Drs. 
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Nataly and Spilker.  Maj. Mel Birnbaum and Dr. Van Dierendonk [17, Parkinson] led design of 
the message structure and the systems engineering process. 
 
3.3.5 Risk Mitigation  
 
One of the key risks going into this phase was the ability to validate that the Atomic Fre-
quency Standards (AFSs), or clocks, performed in a space environment and provided precise 
timing to the user equipment.  The GPS concept was based upon a reliable, ultra-stable AFS.  
The atomic clocks were one of the key technologies instrumental in making GPS a viable 
system.  This technology was developed as an offshoot of research on magnetic resonance to 
measure natural frequencies of atoms that began in 1938 with Dr. Rabi at Columbia University.  
The development of atomic clock technology over the years resulted in more-accurate and 
smaller-packaged atomic clocks.   
 
The atomic clocks in the GPS satellites were essential in providing GPS users accurate 
position, velocity, and time determinations.  They provided a precise standard time – the fourth 
parameter. In addition to the three-dimensional coordinates of the SV, this allowed the user to 
receive sets of four parameters from four satellites and solve the equations establishing a four-
dimensional location of the receiver (three spatial dimensions plus time).  The clocks became 
one of the key development items for the program.   
 
As the GPS program was being established, plans were already in place to conduct test-
ing using the Navy TIMATION satellites with atomic clocks onboard and incorporating Project 
621B code generators.  The objectives of the NTS concept development tests were to validate the 
behavior of accurate space-based clocks, the techniques for high-resolution satellite orbit predic-
tion, the dissemination of precise time data worldwide, and the signal propagation characteristics.  
NRL led the contracting and supply of the NTS atomic clocks.  Two commercial rubidium Rb 
clocks purchased from Efratom Munich and a quartz crystal oscillator were flown on NTS-1.  
The Rb clocks were modified by NRL for flight experiments to reduce expected thermal problems 
in space.  The NTS-1 had attitude determination problems that caused wide temperature swings, 
which caused frequency swings in the clock and failure after about one year.  Necessary 
performance validation data were obtained before the failures.  The Rb clocks were not space-
qualified.  
 
Rockwell developed a PRN code generator and space-borne GPS computer that were 
incorporated into NTS-2.  Two more-robust, space-qualified Cesium atomic clocks built by 
Frequency and Time System (FTS – now Symmetricom) were launched on NTS-2 [30, White].  
 
The NTS effort was managed through a fourth segment of the GP system – the navigation-
technology segment – and focused on validating various technology concepts, especially the 
space-borne atomic clocks.  “The navigation-technology segment of the GPS provided initial 
space-qualification tests of rubidium and cesium clocks.  This segment also provided the original 
test of the GPS signals from space, certification of the relativity theory, measurement of radiation 
effects, longevity effects on solar cells, and initial orbital calculations…Precise time synchroni-
zation of remote worldwide ground clocks was obtained using both NTS-1 and NTS-2 satellites.  
(During) May through September 1978 with a six-nation cooperative experiment,… (tests were) 
performed to inter-compare time standards of major laboratories” (Ref. 1).  The NTS SVs per-
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formed adequately for the prototype objectives intended and provided sufficient data to proceed 
with the further development of improved atomic clocks.  NTS command and telemetry links for 
these tests came from many of the Navy ground systems during the TIMATION program.  
NTS/TIMATION SV tracking and control was accomplished at NRL’s Blossom Point, MD 
satellite control facility.  NRL operated several NTS/TIMATION monitor sites to collect and 
characterize the navigational signal.  Elements and functions of the NTS-2 system, including 
ground stations, are shown in Figure 3-5.  An NTS SV is shown in Figure 3-6. 
 
 
 
      
Figure 3-5.  NTS-2 Command and Telemetry Links (Ref. 1) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3-6.  NTS-2 Satellite (Ref. 23) 
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The other key risk addressed in this phase was the ability to validate the prototype 
receivers being developed could precisely predict location using the navigational and time 
signals being generated.  The primary objective of this phase was to establish performance limits 
of the UE under dynamic conditions in a severe environment.  As Col. Parkinson stated, it was 
“…a classical bureaucratic ‘Catch 22’: How could user equipment development be approved 
when it wasn’t clear it would work with the satellites?  How could the satellites be launched 
without ensuring they would work with the user equipment?” (Ref. 18).  Relying on experience 
from the Project 621WSMR test program, the JPO devised a plan to use an array of four 
surveyed ground-based transmitters (called pseudolites, derived from pseudo-satellites), which 
would generate and transmit the satellite signal.  The test program would be conducted with the 
prototype and initial developmental UE to validate the signal compatibility with the receivers.  
Azimuth and angular errors were a challenge that had to be considered in the test planning and 
execution.  The fidelity of the ground-based system would be enhanced as the Block I satellites 
began to be launched.  Pseudolites were used in conjunction with launched satellites until a 
minimum of four satellites were available in orbit.  The (YPG) was selected as the test site in lieu 
of WSMR as a result of a trade study.  This approach had the benefit of enhancing the Army 
involvement as a stakeholder in the program.  Magnavox Advanced Product Division was re-
sponsible for the development and fabrication of the pseudolites and a control station at the test site. 
 
During the initial phases of testing, problems were encountered when the receiver display 
would indicate an “anti-jam” threat due to the power levels being transmitted by the pseudolites.  
A design and procedure change eliminated the deficiency [11, Green].  This test program was the 
first to use a triple-triangulated laser to conduct precise measurements of aircraft location to verify 
user location (aircraft) [16, Parkinson].  “The laser tracking system provided an accuracy of 
about one meter.  To simulate the much longer real distance between user equipment and the SV, 
an extra code offset was used” (Ref. 16).  Testing was conducted at YPG from March 1977 to 
May 1979.  Demonstrations began with user equipment installed on a C-141 cargo transport, F-
4J fighter, HH-1 helicopter, and Navy P-3 aircraft.  Testing proceeded with manpack and other 
user host vehicles.  Some of the YPG test results with respect to the blind bombing tests with the 
F-4J and X-set receivers, F-4J and C-141 rendezvous test and the manpack tests are shown in 
Figure 3-7.  As the testing progressed and three satellites were in orbit, on-board ship user 
equipment was tested off the California coast.  Eventually during this phase, over 775 mission tests 
were conducted with various classes of test vehicles. 
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Figure 3-7.  Phase 1 YPG Test Results (Ref. 51) 
 
Air Force Test and Evaluation Command (AFTEC, later to become AFOTEC) conducted 
an independent evaluation and found no significant operational issues with the operational demon-
stration tests [17, Parkinson]. 
 
3.3.6 System Integration 
 
The JPO decided to retain core systems engineering/system integration responsibility.  
Col. Parkinson had a concern with the potential for proliferation of systems engineering groups 
within an organization.  He viewed systems engineering as a common-sense approach to creating 
an atmosphere to synthesize solutions based upon a requirements process, and to ensure good 
validation/verification of the design to meet those requirements7. He advocated using good 
systems engineering principles to work issues as they arose [17, Parkinson]. 
 
The “major cornerstone of the program” from a program execution and system integra-
tion perspective were the interface controls.  It was vital not only to this phase, but to the entire 
program, that a strong systems engineering process be established.  This ensured that technical 
inputs and requirements, verification, conditions, and CONOPS of all the government, contractor 
agencies, and international communities were considered in a timely manner, and a means of 
communication among those agencies was established.  
                                                 
7 Col. Parkinson did not mention though implied within reasonable cost and schedule. 
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The integration role required contact with many government and industry entities.  A 
plethora of technical expertise organizations, test organizations, users, etc. required working 
interfaces and integration.  Figure 3-8 provides a view of the program interfaces required with 
other agencies/contractors and indicates the complexity of the interfaces required. 
 
 
 
Figure 3-8.  GPS JPO Agency/Contractor Interfaces 
 
In this phase, a significant amount of fluidity among the design concept and agencies 
involved further underscored the need for unimpeded communications.  The program set up an 
acquisition strategy that created separate contractual efforts for the three major segments: Space 
Vehicle (SV), Control Segment (CS), and User Equipment (UE).  A unique fall-out of this 
delineation was no physical connection between the segments.  All the segment interfaces within 
the system were related to the transmitted signals.  The system specification and the Type I 
Interface Control Documents (ICDs) were written and controlled by the JPO.  The system 
specification was not contractually binding on any of the segment contracts.  The segment 
specifications and their companion ICDs written by the contractors were assessed by the JPO 
System Group for compliance with the system specification.  These specifications and the ICD 
were generally written in cooperation with the JPO.  Interfaces in the CS segment specifications 
were sometimes “soft” with respect to interfaces with other GPS segments and systems.  The 
segment specifications were placed on contract for each of the segment contractors.  This 
situation emphasized the need for a robust interface control process.  
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Figure 3-9 is the top-level specification tree for Block I, which includes the unique Block 
I navigational technology system segment.  Figure 3-10 is a Block II/IIA flow chart, but provides 
a good indication of the interfaces for the major system segments.  The JPO Systems 
Engineering Directorate was responsible for configuration management and accomplished the 
administrative duties and coordination for the Configuration Control Board chaired by the 
Program Director.  
 
Figure 3-9.  Phase I Specification Tree (Ref. 28) 
 
 
Figure 3-10.  Phase II Specification Tree (Ref. 41) 
 
In 1975, the JPO developed and approved the Interface Control Working Group (ICWG) 
Charter that outlined the program interface process.  This document was signed by the service 
representative and the major segment contractors.  The JPO had approval control over ICDs and 
would chair/co-chair all ICWG meetings.  A contractor was identified as the Interface Control 
Coordinator (ICC) with administrative responsibilities in addition to the technical responsibilities 
for their area.  This approach was consistent with the JPO being the system integrator.  Again, 
this was an initial concern to Aerospace Corporation, who expected to have more of a system 
integration role in the program and with the contractors [17, Parkinson].   
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The charter described three levels of ICDs:  
Type I – Interface with agencies outside the JPO; i.e. system-to-system 
Type II – Interfaces between the major segments of the system; e.g. SV -UE  
Type III – Interfaces within the system segments; e.g. CS CI “A” to CS CI “B” 
 
The Charter also established a hierarchy to the interface decision process with the Interface 
Control Steering Group overseeing the Interface Management Group, who oversaw the ICWG to 
ensure a structured means of program issue resolution.  
 
The JPO Systems Engineering Directorate was responsible for configuration management 
of specifications, Level I ICDs, and system design configurations.  The directorate accomplished 
the administrative duties and coordination for the Configuration Control Board, chaired by the 
Program Director. 
 
 Maj. Mel Birnbaum from the Systems Engineering Directorate was the focal point within 
the JPO for the ICWG process during the early phases of the program.  He was credited by his 
peers at the JPO and on the contractor side as the key individual to making the system integration 
work during Phases I and II [25, Scheerer;  21, Reaser ; 8, Fruehauf; 16, Nakamura;  14, 
Krishnamurti; 23, Robertson].  The technical support from Aerospace Corporation to the ICWG 
process also contributed to the success.  Their support in a system integration support role was 
methodic and added technical value, complementing the JPO effort [25, Scheerer].    
  
 The ICWG process would not have worked with the JPO and Aerospace Corporation 
alone – the contractors were an integral part of the process.  Although initially reluctant to being 
controlled by the ICWG, each contractor became very proactive in the process.  Both the JPO 
and the contractor program management provided an atmosphere of mission success that fed this 
support.  Host vehicles (user systems) and other pertinent agencies were always well represented 
and active.  Typically, ICWG meetings lasted two to three days and were very grueling according 
to some participants.  A typical ICWG agenda would consist of a review of the contractor’s latest 
design, identifying interface issues/changes, and establishing action items that were logged and 
tracked.  The status of the segment designs defined the next phase meeting agenda.  There were 
examples of the contractors recognizing an evolving issue and, without direction, working 
overnight to develop a solution by the beginning of the next day’s meeting [17, Parkinson].  
Though the ICWGs were well structured, there was flexibility in the process.  During this phase, 
Rockwell Collins had a concern about the 50 Hz data message definitions in ICD-GPS-200 
between the space segment and the user equipment.  They called Maj. Birnbaum, identified the 
issues, and presented the logical rationale for the need for the change.  Four weeks later, the ICD 
had been changed without further coordination.  The JPO – as the integrator – made the change 
unilaterally [14, Krishnamurti]. 
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The number of ICDs grew during the program.  By 1979, per the ICWG Charter (YEN-
75-134), there were 19 major ICDs identified.  These did not include all the Type III ICDs.  
Eventually, the program managed over 200 Type I-Type III ICDs [21, Reaser].  Figure 3-11 
illustrates the breadth of some of the ICDs.  The ICWG process was instrumental in making the 
system work as an integrated whole.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 3-11.  Interface Control Documents (chart from 2005 JPO SE briefing 
 that captures the breadth of some 200 ICDs) (Ref. 29) 
 
Figure 3-12, GPS Functional Flow Diagram, illustrates the interfaces with other elements 
of the system besides the three major segments defined in the system specification.  The other 
interfaces identified included the rocket, launch, range support, and data processing 
(computational support). 
 
3.3.7 Systems Engineering 
 
 Although the systems engineering process in Phase I has been discussed 
previously, this section will expand on the concepts.  For example, one of the user equipment 
contractors was technically competent, but lacked effective management.  The JPO strongly 
suggested that a systems engineering firm be hired to assist the contractor in managing program 
and they agreed [17, Parkinson]. 
 
In order to conduct the later phase of testing at YPG with Block I SV being in the loop, a 
prototype system had to be developed.  This would consist of a ground control system with up-
load and satellite control, and an optimized SVs test constellation.  The General Dynamics Control/ 
User Segment trade study (Ref. 19) had established a preferred approach, which the JPO followed.  
An interim control system (ICS) was established at Vandenberg AFB (VAFB).  The four remote 
sites were selected based upon three recommended by the General Dynamics study: Hawaii, 
Alaska, and VAFB – Guam was selected for the fourth site.  The contract with General 
Dynamics and Magnavox was a fixed-price contract per direction from HQ AFSC/CC, Gen. 
Alton Slay.  The program at this stage was still too fluid.  Hardware was state-of-the-art and did 
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not present issues.  The major effort was in software for the modeling of ephemeris equations and 
the atomic clocks, as well as maintaining reasonable program error margins/accuracy.  Contractor-
government working relationships were strained as a result of the efforts required once on contract.  
Eventually, communications improved and mutual trust was established [16, Nakamura]. There 
were no typical user/operational input requirements to this phase of the control station 
development. In this concept development phase, the JPO became the “user” for developing the 
requirements for the support systems structure, the CS. The JPO utilized experience from the 
Navy TIMATION launch and SV control systems, the WSMR ground testing, other Air Force 
rocket programs, and the unique requirements of this program to develop the CS concept of 
operations and the performance requirements. 
 
 
 
Figure 3-12.  GPS Functional Flow Diagram (Ref. 28) 
  
In conjunction with this support structure effort, the Systems and Space Segment groups had 
to define a constellation that would maximize the test window over YPG. The General Dynamics 
study had recommended a constellation of four satellites. The baseline program had contracted 
with Rockwell for four Block I satellites, one of which was to be a refurbished qualification unit. 
However, the analysis did not consider the failure mode of any one satellite in orbit, which would 
create coverage and accuracy issues with respect to the YPG test plan.  This had not been 
considered as an issue when the initial program plan was developed. It soon became apparent, 
after further analysis, that the minimum satellite requirement for testing was six in order to assure 
acquisition of data to meet the objectives of this phase. The program needed spare satellites to 
complement the four that Rockwell was on task to supply. This situation presented a cost and 
schedule risk to the demonstration testing. The requirement for four SVs was reflected in the 
budget established for the program during and soon after DSARC I. It would be quite difficult to 
request additional funding so soon after the baseline program was established. In the upfront 
program formation, the systems engineering process had not adequately addressed the 
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reliability/availability and logistics/support requirements in conjunction with the test mission, 
concept of operations, and schedule for this concept development phase.   
 
While the JPO was trying to solve the critical dilemma of insufficient number of satellites 
to conduct a reasonable test program, the Navy TRANSIT program was submitting a request for 
funding to provide an upgrade to track the Trident booster. The TRANSIT plan included use of a 
PRN code similar to the GPS baseline signal. The JPO saw this as an opportunity to solve their 
satellite dilemma. The Systems Engineering group investigated options to provide the TRANSIT 
program their enhanced capability and the JPO funding for the needed additional satellites. The 
JPO proposed an approach to have the JPO be responsible for providing TRANSIT capability. 
The technical solution that the GPS program developed was to accomplish the mission using a 
signal translator on a missile bus relay. “Dr. Bob Cooper of DDR&E requested a series of 
reviews addressing whether GPS could fulfill the (TRANSIT) mission” (Ref. 15). After a series 
of reviews, Dr. Cooper concurred with the JPO proposal and transferred $60M of Navy funds to 
GPS, which would allow two additional satellites to be acquired and provide TRANSIT with 
their enhanced capability.   
 
The JPO, with assistance of Aerospace Corporation, conducted analyses and trade 
studies.  They determined that a constellation with satellites in two circular planes would allow the 
six satellites to cluster over the western CONUS once per day.  This would provide three-
dimensional coverage for one to three hours at the YPG. Each satellite was uploaded daily from 
the ground stations just prior to being viewed over YPG.   
 
The two major system accuracy requirements, time and position, were allocated to vari-
ous segments via error budgets. In the Precise Positioning Service (PPS) system, range error – a 
measure of the error in range to each satellite as seen by the receiver – was allocated to the three 
major segments.  These allocations are depicted in Table 3-6.  
 
Table 3-6.  GPS PPS System Error Range Budget (Ref. 42)* 
 
Segment Error Source 
UERE Contribution 
(meters, 95%) 
P-Code C/A Code 
Space 
Frequency standard stability 6.5 6.5 
D-band delay variation 1.0 1.0 
Space vehicle acceleration uncertainty 2.0 2.0 
Other 1.0 1.0 
Control Ephemeris prediction and model implementation 8.2 8.2 Other  1.8 1.8 
User 
Ionospheric delay compensation 4.5 9.8-19.6 
Tropospheric delay compensation 3.9 3.9 
Receiver noise and reduction 2.9 2.9 
Multipath 2.4 2.4 
Other 1.0 1.0 
Total (RSS) System UERE (meters, 95%) 13.0 15.7-23.1 
*User Range Equivalent Error (UERE) is a measure of the error in range measurement to each satellite as 
seen by the receiver. The portion allocated to the Space and Control Segments is called the User Range 
Error (URE) and the portion allocated to the UE is called the UE Error (UEE). UERE is the root-sum-square 
of the URE and UEE.  
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The system time transfer error budget (in nanoseconds based upon 95% probability) 
allocations are depicted in Table 3-7. Each of the major system segments was responsible for 
meeting their allocated error budget requirements. These time and position allocations were not 
only tracked by the Segment Group, but also by the Systems Group within the JPO.   
 
Table 3-7.  GPS Time Error Budget (Ref. 42)  
Error Component Error (ns, 95%) 
US Naval Observatory Measurement Component 137 
Control Segment Measurement Component  59 
GPS Time Predictability 92 
Navigation Message Quantization 6 
Satellite Orbit  22 
Satellite Clock 63 
Satellite Group Delay 12 
Downlink and User Equipment 65 
Total (RSS) Time Transfer Error Budget 199 
 
3.3.8 DSARC II 
 
The programmatic culmination of Phase I was to provide evidence of meeting the objec-
tives of the phase and obtain approval from DSARC II to proceed to the next phase.  Included were 
full-scale engineering development, validated navigation signal compatibility, prototype ground 
station, and preferred UE designs. AFTEC determined that there were no major operational 
deficiencies that would prohibit continued development and testing. This phase had 
demonstrated the capability of the atomic clocks to be a stable system in the space environment 
and established cost estimates for the program. DSARC II was held on 5 Jun 1979. The “DSARC 
has expressed concern about system cost, notwithstanding the demonstrated performance and the 
significant operational benefits which will accrue by its deployment…places the DSARC 
approved program alternative at the Basic level and a delayed program of reduced 
scope.…thorough review to identify potential cost reductions (i.e. analysis of all requirements, 
system specifications, testing contracting, etc.) but also restraint during the engineering 
development phase to insure future development efforts are focused on essential modifications” 
(Ref. 30). As a result of the DSCARC, the baseline IOC was revised to 1986.   
 
3.4 System Development (Phase II, Block I) 
 
3.4.1 Objectives 
 
The objectives of Phase II were to develop the SVs, complete Initial operational Test and 
Evaluation (IOT&E) of user equipment, initiate production of low-cost mission-support UE, and 
establish a two-dimensional limited operational capability. Rockwell International had been 
placed on contract for the SV development and General Dynamics was on contract for the ICS. 
Block I would not require implementation of selective availability or anti-spoofing 
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requirements8.  The requirement for a nuclear detection system as a secondary payload was to be 
implemented. The launch vehicle for these SVs was the Atlas E/F.    
 
3.4.2 Systems Engineering (JPO) 
 
During this time frame, Col. Reynolds (JPO Director 1980 to 1983) determined that the 
Systems Engineering Directorate should take on more of an integration role. He believed that too 
many unresolved issues between the segments and/or systems were being raised to his level for 
conflict resolution. He wanted the Systems Engineering Directorate to be mainly responsible for 
the integration between the system segments. Their mission was changed to receive, debate, and 
allocate requirements; arbitrate issues among the segments; maintain the system architecture, 
which was fairly stable at this time; and continue to be responsible for the ICDs and system 
specification [22, Reynolds]. They  would also monitor systems engineering processes being 
used by the segments. This Directorate was “…like an anti-body forcing Segments to make sure 
they were doing good systems engineering. Otherwise, the Segment group feared that the Systems 
Engineering Directorate would get involved in your program and possibly take over [21, Reaser].” 
Col. Reynolds’ philosophy during this phase was “…don’t be elegant and don’t make everything 
new, go with proven technology” [22, Reynolds]. 
 
Col. Reynolds also wanted to assure support from other communities (e.g. DMA, FAA, 
USCG, and Cambridge Research Laboratory). This was a critical time in the program from a 
budget standpoint, and to proactively advocate the program utility to potential customers within 
DoD, international allies, and the commercial side. The Systems Engineering Directorate was 
responsible for providing domain knowledge of interfaces to the potential customer’s 
requirements. This was often accomplished on-site with demonstrations (with the manpack). 
     
Col. Reynolds formed alliances with the communities that were neutral, or even 
antagonistic, toward the program. The FAA was developing the microwave landing system and 
GPS could be considered a threat to that program. The JPO worked with the FAA to provide 
better insight into the capabilities and limitations of GPS. Cambridge Research Laboratory 
favored the Inertial Navigational System (INS) and appeared antagonistic toward GPS. Col. 
Reynolds hired Cambridge Research Laboratory to conduct a study of INS and GPS, resulting in 
a more favorable attitude toward the program, in addition to the technical benefit of the study.  
 
3.4.3 Interface Requirements 
 
During the development of the Interim Control Segment (ICS), an interface issue arose 
with respect to telephone communications with the remote sites. The timeframe of this issue was 
soon after the split-up of Bell Systems (AT&T) in 1984, due to the court ruling with respect to 
monopoly interests. The contractors and government did not foresee the problems with the small 
telephone companies on the West Coast establishing unique requirements/procedures that impacted 
the effort to try and establish communications links among the remote stations, master control, 
and the test facility. Communications routes along the West Coast and over to YPG required 
extensive workarounds and time-consuming solutions [20, Prouty].  
 
                                                 
8 Selective availability is the intentional degradation of the transmitted signal by a time-varying bias on the C/A code. 
Anti-spoofing guards against fake transmissions by encrypting the P-code to form the Y-code. 
 46
3.4.4 Budgetary Impacts to Functional Baseline 
 
Funding became a major issue for the program in the late 1970s and early 1980s. The Air 
Force, in general, was not supportive of the budget requests from the JPO. The DSARC II had 
recommended the continuance of the program at a reduced scope, as mentioned in Paragraph 
3.3.8. Systems engineering would play a key role in reassessing the functional baseline. There 
had been a 10% reduction ($500M) in program funding. The program was restructured, resulting 
in a reduction in the number of Block II SVs and a change in some performance requirements, 
such as weight and power. 
  
Senior Air Force staff questioned the ability of the system to survive threats and re-
quested that a study be conducted to identify those threats, threat countermeasures, and the cost of 
those countermeasures. The Defense Intelligence Agency had no defined threat against the GPS. 
The task was passed down to the Air Force and AFSC intelligence agencies before the JPO was 
finally tasked and accepted to identify and assess potential threats. Systems engineering had been 
continuously assessing threats to the system during the development effort. There was a 
classified appendix to the system specification that detailed a threat environment that the JPO 
had postulated, as there had not been any “official” defined threat. The UE contractors had to 
meet this requirement, which was a tough set of requirements with respect to ground and 
airborne jammers [25, Scheerer]. There was no consensus within the Air Force as to the threat 
requirement and there was a genuine concern about the ability to jam the receiver. Eventually, an 
“exaggerated” baseline threat scenario was established for the user equipment by which the foe 
had a powerful jammer (100 KW) on 80-foot-high towers near the Forward Edge of the Battle 
Area (FEBA) [25, Scheerer; 22, Reynolds]. The JPO set up and conducted testing to simulate 
this condition based upon many assumptions and the scenario was successfully demonstrated. 
However, there still was reluctance to fund the program. There was also a request to estimate the 
cost of nuclear hardening the SV. The JPO estimated $850M for the development and production 
costs [22, Reynolds].  
 
From 1980 through 1982, funding for the program was essentially zeroed out by the Air 
Force, which recommended cancellation of the program. The AF budget proposed sufficient 
funds to maintain operation of six Block I satellites to enable the Navy to continue data gathering 
and characterization of the Fleet Ballistic Missile (FBM) Improved Accuracy Program (IAP). 
There were indicators within the JPO at the Control Segment Critical Design Review (CDR) and 
at a major navigational symposium that the program was to be cancelled. Senate staffers asked 
the JPO for cost estimates to shut down the program , even though they had not thought about 
the cost to go to other alternatives. It appeared Air Staff would not support the program. The JPO 
fostered dependencies such as embedding GPS navigation into the platforms mission – such as 
the F-16 aircraft program and the Joint Tactical Information Distribution System (JTIDS) – that 
would stimulate funding. After a briefing by Col. Reynolds, Secretary of Defense Harold Brown9 
observed the global military need, the vested alliances established by the JPO, and future 
potential users.  He reinstated the funding, including the estimated funding for nuclear hardening. 
Again, DoD acted in the user capacity and was influential in saving the program. Even with the 
change in Presidential administrations, Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger10 would 
eventually continue to support the program [22, Reynolds].  
                                                 
9 Honorable Harold Brown was Secretary of Defense from 21 Jan 1977 to 20 Jan 1981 
10 Honorable Casper Weinberger was Secretary of Defense from 21 Jan 1981 to 23 Nov 8 
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 As a result of these budgetary exercises and funding cuts, one of the major program 
impacts was to the system architecture. The number of Block II satellites had to be reduced from 
21 to 18. The JPO needed to determine the impact on global coverage, and what would be the 
optimal SV configuration. Through the systems engineering process, SV constellation trade studies 
to determine the minimum number of satellites were conducted primarily by the JPO and 
Aerospace Corporation with inputs from Rockwell. The conclusion was an 18-satellite 
constellation to provide continuous global coverage to primary areas of interest. After extensive 
analysis, a 6-plane constellation with equal spacing within the plane and a 55-degree inclination 
(limited by launch vehicle constraints) was selected. Note that the breakpoint between a 3-plane 
and 6-plane constellation was 21 SVs.  Below 21 SVs, the 6-plane was more advantageous. The 
implementation of the presidential directive to launch all Air Force satellites from the space 
shuttle (see Paragraph 3.5.4 for more detail) was an influencing factor in the selection of the 
inclination. Since the SVs had to be man-rated with respect to the Space Shuttle, the launch site 
was moved from VAFB to Cape Canaveral. Launching from Cape Canaveral could not support a 
63-degree inclination and had to be reduced to a 55-degree inclination [25, Scheerer]. The three 
spares would be inserted into every other plane, for a total of 21 satellites. The outage of any SV 
could disrupt the service over one or more critical areas of the globe with this configuration, until 
the replacement satellite was deployed [22, Reynolds; 25, Scheerer; 11, Green; 21, Reaser].   
 
The Air Force decided in the late 1970s to remove the IONDs requirement from the GPS 
program and transfer it to the Defense Satellite Program (DSP). The GPS program was seeking 
strategic alliances to help with funding problems in this timeframe and saw an opportunity to “re-
claim” this capability. They proposed to Gen. Jacobson at the Pentagon that, if the nuclear detection 
system requirement was returned to the GPS JPO, the nuclear detection capability could have a 
worldwide edge with the GPS satellites. The request was approved with the transfer of NDS inte-
gration funding and the requirement was inserted into Block II [20, Prouty]. The NDS requirement 
had been changed from the initial IONDS, in that an electromagnetic pulse (EMP) sensor would 
be required. The functional baseline was again adjusted to accommodate this new requirement.  
   
3.4.5 Rockwell International Systems Engineering 
 
The Rockwell International GPS Satellite Program Manager organized his workforce to 
parallel the JPO organization so that there would be a counterpart in Rockwell for each JPO 
responsibility. He believed that communications were extremely important and that there was a 
need to know who to contact (both government and contractor) when there was an issue. Rockwell 
organized their engineering staff into a classic project organization with a systems engineering 
office, subsystems engineers, and Work Breakdown Structure (WBS) task team leaders reporting 
directly to the chief program engineer. The Rockwell International Block I GPS Program 
Organization chart is in Appendix 6. The two major ICDs were with the Control Segment and 
User Equipment Segment. Internal ICDS (Type IIIs) were established, as required within the 
subsystems. Requirements levied on Rockwell were top-level performance requirements such as 
SV life, signal generation, error budget, and interface requirements [21, Reaser]. Design and 
interface requirements drove system-level requirements in many cases, as there was no single 
Using Command to establish them. Contractors conducted design studies to determine the best 
way to implement decisions. Rockwell was focused on technical solutions that minimized cost 
and schedule impact [8, Fruehauf].  
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When the IONDS requirements were levied on Rockwell, a separate chief engineer 
became responsible for the interface of IONDS and the SV; the development of the L3 signal 
peculiar to IONDS data transmission; and the establishment of the ICD and MOA with the 
Department of Energy (DOE), specifically Sandia National Laboratories and Los Alamos 
Laboratory.  
 
The Rockwell GPS Block I design and development team (Appendix 6) focused on sim-
plicity of design for easy manufacturing and addressing the functionality of the high-risk compo-
nents. These high-risk items were: (a) the atomic clocks; (b) the navigation payload; (c) the RF chain/ 
High Power Amplifier (HPA); and (d) the antenna. These components were designed, fabricated, 
and tested prior to contract award to reduce risk and to demonstrate feasibility. Throughout the de-
sign and development process, the theme for the GPS team was “build what is designed during the 
proposal phase.” This enhanced the subsequent success during the relatively short factory-to-
launch-pad schedule. The successful GPS satellite design was the result of several engineering 
concepts:  
1. Focus on designing the satellite around the most important and environmentally sensitive 
component – the clocks, with all other considerations virtually secondary. 
2. Simplicity of design that made the satellite highly reliable, more producible, cost effective, 
and compatible (without constraints) for launch initially from Atlas-F ICBMs. This reduc-
tion in complexity extended to launch and on-orbit operations. 
3. Trade studies and subsequent sub-system designs that contributed to the GPS satellite sim-
plicity and reliability included: 
a. Utilized single degree of freedom solar array drives and yawing the spacecraft for the 
needed second degree of solar array freedom. 
b. Selected solid-state HPAs – versus less-expensive Travel Wave Tubes (TWT) – for long 
life, reduced power consumption, and elimination of high-voltage power supplies. 
c. No on-board computer running the navigation-operations functions. 
d. Utilized passive thermal control system especially designed to accommodate the temperature-
sensitive clocks, again reducing power consumption. 
e. Optimized spread spectrum ranging and data-stream signal structure to meet link require-
ments, while at the same time adhering to the constraints of the national and international 
regulations concerning electromagnetic radiation (Note: The GPS receiving signal power 
was approximately 1x10-16 watts – practically undetectable – and, therefore, would not 
require licensing in foreign countries).  
f. In response to a joint JPO and Rockwell concern about how to maximize coverage of a 
single SV broadcast, developed the 12-helix phased array antenna (Al Love of Rockwell 
International invented the unique antenna), shifting the usual excess radiated signal power 
at the bore site to the 5-degree elevation angle.  This reduced power consumption and 
provided a more homogeneous radiation pattern to the earth’s surface from the SVs’ line of 
sight.  
g. Incorporated magnetic momentum dumping11 of the active control system (ACS) reaction 
wheels for longer spacecraft orbital life.  
                                                 
11 Magnetic Momentum Dumping (MMD) was developed for the program by the Astronautic Department at the US 
Air Force Academy and first tried on Block I as an experiment. After the technology was proven, it was baselined 
into the Block I Replenishment SVs and the Block II SVs [21 Reaser]. MMD is the capability to generate sufficient 
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The above efforts contributed to the reduction of solar panel surface area and to control the 
weight allocated requirement. 
 
For the GPS Block I build phase, among the many systems engineering management 
concepts that contributed to cost and schedule efficiencies, was the purposeful violation of the 
common taboo: “a prime contractor is advised not to be in series with the contract performance 
of the subcontractors.” On the contrary, Rockwell placed itself in series in two areas: radiation 
hardening design and the high-reliability space parts program. 
 
The radiation-hardening requirement was a new technical challenge for most subcontractors. 
Rockwell offered the subcontractors “zero-risk” radiation hardening design and technical expertise 
via a 40-hour subcontractor bid of interface time with Dr. Norman Rudy from Rockwell’s Ballistic 
Missile Division. Dr. Rudy reviewed designs in-progress, often on-site, and necessary changes 
were accomplished up-front, thus reducing risk of meeting the radiation requirements. Often this 
was accomplished in unique innovative system approaches.  Beside minor box redesigns and use 
of parts, they included needed circuit changes/additions, local parts or box shielding, and shadow 
shielding from other hardware at the spacecraft level. One or more of these techniques was 
applied, with Rockwell accepting the subcontractor’s product as compliant. 
 
The high-reliability, space-qualified, S-Level (or S-equivalent) parts program was another 
risk-free venture for the subcontractors on a voluntary basis. All but one of almost a dozen sub-
contractors participated in the parts pool. A qualified space parts list (QPL) was generated, with 
subcontractors adding unique parts that required qualification. Total-requirement part lots were 
purchased by Rockwell and S-equivalent screened when needed, qualified, and made available 
for subcontractor draw-down. Using a NASA-qualified central screening house became a source 
of huge cost and schedule savings. Beyond the programmatic advantages, spacecraft reliability 
was achieved through large and common (non-fragmented) lot date codes: traceable, predictable 
performance, and consistent test and screening procedures [8, Fruehauf]. 
 
Rockwell, as the SV segment developer, was the lead on the system development of the 
signal with coordination with the UE segment. The only systems engineering decision driven by 
the UE was the number of SVs that would be above the horizon (three or four) in order to keep 
the cost of the UE low (Section 3.4.8 provides additional information). 
 
SV weight was an identified upfront concern – only a 50 pound margin was allowed. 
Tracking was by Technical Performance Measures (TPMs) and status was reviewed weekly by 
the RI Chief Engineer.  
 
RI tailored the general military specifications imposed on the GPS contract before pass-
ing requirements onto the subcontractors. These tailored requirements were then incorporated into 
a specific boilerplate section of all the subcontractor specifications. RI engineering managers were 
in daily or weekly contact with their subcontractors with frequent visits. The JPO and Aerospace 
had people assigned to each subsystem who, as part of this mini-team with RI, evaluated all 
                                                                                                                                                             
torque through magnets to dump excess momentum from on-board reaction wheels without disturbing the precise 
ephemeris of the SV. 
 
 50
aspects of the subcontractor. Formal subcontractor management reviews were conducted by RI 
every 3-4 months with Capt. Green (JPO SV Manager), Irv Rezpnick (Senior Aerospace Manager), 
and other supporting personnel accompanying Mr. Schwartz. Review out-briefs were made to the 
subcontractor head at the facility on the results of the visit [26, Schwartz].  
 
Box-level qualification and acceptance testing were accomplished according with MIL-
STD-1540. The program was one of the first to use this specification to detail requirements for 
functional, shock, vibration, and thermal testing [26, Schwartz]. See paragraph 3.3.7 for further 
insight on this subject.  
 
The parts control program (mentioned above with respect to the RI systems engineering 
effort) was controlled by the JPO and was a significant systems engineering effort. The program 
was maintained under the Systems Engineering Directorate. The Configuration Control Board 
(CCB), administrated under this directorate, maintained configuration management of the parts 
program process [25, Scheerer]. There were small sets of S-level and JAN X parts approved by 
the government at this time. The cost and schedule associated with developing new S-level parts 
unique for GPS was prohibitive. Rockwell, with JPO concurrence, pursued the S-equivalent 
approach that took existing non-S-level approved parts and established stringent screening 
processes to attain a space-reliable part that met its allocated availability/reliability requirement.       
 
The GPS Block I parts program and unique requirements/verification processes established 
for S-equivalent and JAN X-equivalent parts was the basis for most of the thinking, require-
ments, and processes that went into MIL-STD-1546 (USAF): Parts, Materials and Processes 
Standardization Control and Management Program for Spacecraft and Launch Vehicles (12 Feb 
1981 original release), and MIL-STD-1547: Electronic Parts, Material and Processes for Space 
and Launch Vehicles (31 Oct 1981 original release)  [21 Reaser].    
 
RI’s approach to system requirements and design also included consideration of Factory-
to-Pad logistic operations. Mr. Dick Schwartz, RI GPS program manger, stated, “I think this 
(Factory-to-Pad) was an Aerospace (Corporation) idea and a good one. After thermal vacuum we 
configured the space craft for shipment, performed a final factory functional (FFF), placed the 
satellite on a truck, and delivered to the pad. The truck backed up to the booster at VAFB and the 
satellite was placed on the booster. We then had a short test to assure that no damage occurred in 
transportation and were ready to launch” (Ref. 37). 
 
3.4.6 Atomic Clocks 
 
One of the major challenges for Block I was to develop a space-qualified clock based upon 
the data and lessons learned from TIMATION and the NTS program. The original baseline for 
the Block I was that each satellite would contain two Rubidium (Rb) and one Cesium (Cs) 
atomic clocks after SVN #3. As it turned out, however, three Rb clocks were flown on SVN 1, 2, 
and 3, and 2 Rb and one second-generation preproduction model Cs clock was incorporated after 
SVN#3. The Cs clock was referred to as a Pre-Production Model (PPM) and was derived from 
the NTS-2 Cs clock [30, White]. The top-level requirements were clock stability and a service 
design life requirement of five years. Embedded in the service life requirement was the ability to 
withstand the space environment, especially thermal and radiation effects. NRL had adequately 
addressed the radiation effects on the clocks in the early phase of this program [21, Reaser]. Ten 
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Block I SVs were successfully inserted into orbit. The SVs generally operated between 8-14 
years with, “…a majority of the clocks performing well beyond their expected life expectancy” 
(Ref. 31). 
 
In this phase of the program, Rockwell was responsible for the development of the Rb 
atomic clocks. Radiation environment data was available and there were documented lessons 
learned from the TIMATION and NTS effort. The challenge for Rockwell was the Rb lamp, 
which was a high-risk effort. RI utilized technical expertise from Aerospace Corporation to 
resolve issues with the lamp. A rigorous ground test with actual hardware was conducted to 
verify thermal, radiation, and life cycle requirements [8, Fruehauf].   
 
Beginning with Block I, Rockwell’s baseline clock consisted of Rockwell-Efratom pro-
duced Rb clocks. The initial Block I satellites flew three Rb clocks and no Cs units. Toward the 
final Block I program, Cs was introduced. For Block II/IIA, two Rb clocks and two Cs FTS 
clocks were established as the baseline configuration per satellite. Originally, the Cs clocks were 
to be provided by three different companies, with Frequency and Time Systems (FTS) supplying 
the majority of the Cs clocks. NRL, funded by the Navy, conducted a second source develop-
ment effort for Cs clocks with FEI and Kernco. However, none of the alternate clocks ever 
became operational on a GPS satellite. Several second-source Cs clocks flew on Block IIA SVs. 
A Block II Cs atomic clock is shown in Figure 3-13.   
   
 
 
Figure 3-13.  Block II Cesium Atomic Clock (Ref. 50) 
 
In Block IIR, a second source effort was directed by the JPO to control cost and schedule. 
Under RI contract, EE&G was selected to build the Rb clocks and qualified the clock for the 
space environment [21, Reaser].   
  
 One of the major program issues is the manufacturing base for space-qualified atomic 
clocks. The program purchases clocks in small lots, e.g. approximately 30-40 per lot, with a lull 
in lot orders for many years. There is no other commercial or military need for this space-
qualified product. As a result, the clock vendors are not stable, and companies either lose their 
expertise and corporate knowledge or go out of business. For Phase IIR, the plan was to have 
(Cs) and (Rb) clocks on board the SV. The Cs clocks were to be built by SCI using technology 
transferred from Kernco. The technology transfer was not successful and the SCI clocks were 
never suitably qualified for space environment. Hence, the SV segment baselined three (Rb) 
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Perkin Elmer clocks and no Cs clocks for Phase IIR. A summary of the atomic clocks used in the 
SVs for the various phases is listed in Table 3-8. 
 
 The problem of atomic clock supply worsened as GPS became successful and more 
widely used.  GPS became the global standard for accurate time, thereby further shrinking the 
market for atomic clocks.  As this market shrinks, it becomes even more difficult for the GPS 
program to buy the clocks it needs to maintain the global time standard.  Ironically, the 
program’s success is killing the market for its own critical component. 
 
Table 3-8.  GPS Atomic Clocks [8, Fruehauf, 21 Reaser, 30 White] 
 
 Rb Clocks Cs Clocks 
NTS-1 
Two modified commercial Efratom 
clocks (also, 1 high-quality quartz 
oscillator) under contract to NRL 
 
NTS-2  Two space-qualified FTS under contract to NRL  
Block I 
Three Rockwell-Efratom clocks 
(SVN #1, 2 & 3); two Rockwell-
Efratom clocks for SVN #4+ 
No clocks for SVN #1, 2 & 3; one 
FTS for SVN #4+ (NRL contract) 
Block II/IIA  Two Rockwell-Efratom clocks   Two FTS under contract to RI 
Block IIR Three EG&G (Perkin Elmer) under contract to RI  
 
3.4.7 Control Segment 
 
 The ground support system located at VAFB and the remote sites (referred to as the ICS) 
were established for the concept validation phase and upgraded as required to support the Block I 
SVs. This was primarily a software upgrade. The ICS had to address navigation critical systems, 
ephemeris algorithms, L-band signals, clock state, time transfer, processing uploads, and control 
of SV. The concept of selective availability during this Block I effort was unclassified, which 
eliminated any requirement for classified crypto equipment. ICDs between Maser Control Station 
(MCS) and remote sites were updated. Interfaces with USNO through ICDs were also established 
with respect to time transfer and updates from USNO. 
   
This phase of the program became the first real instance of operational commands 
supporting the program. Around 1980, HQ SAC took on the responsibility of being the operator 
of ICS. Training was accomplished primarily through on-the-job training from the JPO and the 
contractor, IBM.  HQ SAC handpicked their operators, and they were all engineers [16, 
Nakamura]. This approach had the additional benefit of having the operators perform some 
limited troubleshooting. SAC also established a liaison officer at JPO and provided guidance in 
developing operating concepts for the control segment. Established ICDs between MCS and 
remote sites were updated. 
    
In the early 1980s, a major Air Force trade study investigated whether Fortuna AFS or 
Colorado Springs, CO would be best suited to house the AF Consolidated Space Operations Center 
(CSOC). Colorado Springs was selected. Falcon AFB, which eventually became Schriever AFB, 
was established as the location for CSOC and the GPS Master Control Station that would be part 
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of this complex. This selection would impact requirements relating to the development of the 
Operational Control System (OCS) in the next phase.   
 
USNO had the responsibility for precise time. One of the requirements for GPS is that it 
provides a worldwide time reference system for UTC (USNO) to every GPS user. To ensure the 
accuracy of the SV signal transmission, the USNO needs to receive GPS time and UTC (USNO) 
from the SVs and compare it with the USNO master clock. Corrections in terms of time bias and 
drift offset were transmitted to the GPS MCS for upload to the SVs. An ICD was established 
with the GPS CS. In 1978, USNO in coordination with the JPO contracted with Stanford 
Telecommunications to build the time transfer unit receiver in the Washington, DC area. The 
system became operational in 1979. Only one satellite is required to receive the precise time, 
assuming that the user already knows their precise position [19, Powers]. It should be noted that 
there were several users, especially in the commercial world, that value the GPS precise time 
over the GPS position data, as they already know their precise position. Early in the program 
with only a few satellites, some users bought GPS sets just for precise time. Today, virtually all 
bank transactions are date stamped with GPS time and most communication networks are 
synchronized with GPS time [25, Scheerer].  
 
The SV design had an impact on the CS procedures. Orientation of the thruster rocket 
plume had an adverse affect on the solar panel in certain orientations (low beta angle with respect 
to the sun) that created a momentum reaction, making the vehicle unstable. One of the initial 
Navigational Development Satellites became unstable during a maneuver and had to be 
recovered over a two-week time span. No design changes were made to the SVs in this phase. 
Procedure precautions were used to ensure that thrusters were not used when beta was low [16, 
Nakamura].  
  
3.4.8 User Equipment   
 
One of the more important decisions made early in the program with respect to UE was 
based upon a system trade study.  It established in the system architecture that there would be a 
minimum of four SVs above the horizon at all times. This allowed the development of receivers 
with inexpensive crystal oscillators in lieu of precision atomic clocks. The UE measures the dif-
ference between the time of transmission of the signal by the SV and the time of reception of the 
signal by the UE to determine the three-dimensional position of the UE. With three satellites, a 
very precise time source would be required. However, with a fourth satellite, the fourth dimen-
sion of precise time can be determined and a quartz oscillator can be used by the UE to provide 
the required accuracy. This decision avoided cost and potential weight/size impacts and opera-
tional utility impacts to the UE. 
 
 The decision to avoid precise clocks in the UE by keeping four satellites in view 
was a distinguishing factor in selecting TIMATION versus 621B.  TIMATION used the fourth 
satellite for precise time, and 621B incorporated clocks in the UE.  This key long term decision 
makes UE cheap at the cost of more expensive constellations.  For the commercial users, this is a 
major benefit.  
  
 The program continually used a risk reduction philosophy of funding studies or designs to a 
multitude of sources, and then conducting a down-select. The competition among the contractors 
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provided investigation of new and innovative ideas, and also tailored costs. The program further 
reduced risk in that the multi-contracts usually were completed at a System Design Review (SDR)- 
or Preliminary Design Review (PDR)-type design. This approach allowed a better understanding 
of the events, schedule, cost, and risk in the next phase, and therefore could be better scoped in 
the RFP, proposal, and contract. However, this approach required both good planning knowledge 
as to when to implement this philosophy, and up-front funding to contract with multiple sources.  
 
  This phase of the program for UE was divided into a Phase IIA and Phase IIB. In July 1979, 
the JPO awarded Phase IIA fixed-price contracts to Magnavox, Texas Instruments, Rockwell 
Collins, and Teledyne for pre-design/performance analysis.   
 
 In 1982, a down-select occurred (Ref. 3). Magnavox and Rockwell Collins were both 
awarded Phase IIB contracts to continue development by refining requirements, fabricating proto-
types, completing design, conducting qualification testing, and accomplishing extensive field 
testing. Most of the field testing was conducted at YPG and the Naval Ocean Systems Center at 
San Diego, CA.  
 
 The Rockwell Collins process stressed a firm architecture supported by analysis. Their 
intent was to ensure that manufacturing/quality assurance were involved in the design process 
and strove for simplicity/commonality in the design. During this phase, Rockwell Collins used a 
modular approach that included a flexible module interface concept, by which modules were 
bolted to a common GPS receiver. This approach allowed commonality for various aircraft and 
reduced schedule and technical risk. Human factors played an important role in the man-machine 
interface, especially with the soldier variant [14, Krishnamurti]. 
 
As the number of users was increasing, both amongst the services and internationally, a 
new trend emerged: some of these users were providing requirements directly to the contractor. 
The systems engineering process was reemphasized with the need to utilize services and 
international representatives within the JPO.  This required the JPO to perform a systematic 
assessment to both validate and track the requirements. [24, Saad]. 
 
A major issue arose in the security classification requirements of the UE during the devel-
opment of Selective Availability (SA) and Anti-Spoofing (AS) (SAAS) software12.13 National 
Security Agency (NSA) staff concluded that the UE should be considered a crypto device. This 
“new” requirement was assessed by the JPO. The systems engineering analysis identified major 
consequences to the GPS design and operations if this requirement was implemented. The 
CONOPS would be adversely affected due to the additional security needed in the field. The 
analysis also concluded that there would be potential impacts by adding another required Line 
Replaceable Unit (LRU) to the design to accommodate the new security requirement. An 
example of these impacts was that the manpack would have had a 15 pound additional LRU 
added to a device that already had a weight concern of ~10-15 pounds for manned portability. 
Several JPO discussions with NSA about the new requirement resulted in no mutual resolution, 
and NSA officials suggested alternative designs. The JPO systems engineering process assessed 
the alternative designs and found them inappropriate with respect to meeting other GPS 
requirements. The JPO continued their systems engineering process addressing CONOPS, 
                                                 
12 SA was solely software and AS was both hardware and software. 
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mission analysis, requirements and design analysis including security, and developed their own 
approach to the cryptology methodology. The issue finally worked its way up to the NSA Senior 
Manager. He considered aspects of the issue including the JPO approach, and resolved the matter 
by approving the JPO approach. After this, the JPO and NSA had a very constructive working 
relationship [25, Scheerer].  
 
3.4.9 Design Reviews 
 
Classic Preliminary Design Reviews (PDRs) and Critical Design Reviews (CDRs) were 
conducted in each of the GPS segments. MIL-STD-1521, “Technical Reviews and Audits for 
Systems, Equipments, and Computer Software,” was used as the basis of the design reviews. The 
standard was cancelled by the DoD later in the program; however, its use set up a valuable 
process for conducting the reviews and audits [16, Nakamura]. 
 
There was no overall GPS Systems PDR and CDR conducted. The JPO, as the system 
integrator, with technical assistance of Aerospace Corporation, verified compliance of segment 
designs to the system specification and the system architecture controlled by the JPO. This veri-
fication was an ongoing effort. In some cases, the ICWG process resulted in meetings that were 
more like a technical interchange meeting or mini-design review, to which the meeting would 
define the next phase of effort based upon the segments design status [21, Reaser]. This defi-
nitely was the case with the UE segment for both PDRs and CDRs. The host platform UE design 
reviews were informally conducted at the ICWG meetings for that UE receiver class. Types of 
classes for receivers included portable (soldier/land vehicles), aircraft medium dynamics 
(helicopters), aircraft high dynamics, and ships. The UE system segment specification design 
reviews, both PDR and CDR, covered all class receivers together [14, Krishnamurti]. In general, 
any requirement that had a “to-be-determined” status at PDR was deferred to the next upgrade 
program [24, Saad]. 
   
From one perspective, the ICWGs could have been considered more important as a 
design risk mitigation process than the typical design reviews. Issues were worked in real time 
and incrementally with a very structured process that tracked actions and was well-supported by 
the government and contractors.    
   
3.4.10 System Integration 
 
 The JPO actually became involved in the aircraft integration to the dismay of several air-
craft program offices. However, the JPO in-depth knowledge base and lessons learned from the 
concept validation and early system development phases were important to ensure that 
integration requirements were clearly defined and that there was a clear means of requirement 
verification. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the program was also trying to survive among bud-
get cuts and perception of cancellation. The JPO motivation was to ensure successful integration 
of the UE on the host platform to establish another alliance to justify proceeding with the 
program [21, Reaser]. 
   
3.4.11 ICWG  
 
The ICDs were maturing as the requirements analysis was concluding and new require-
ments were being added to the program in this phase. Additional interfaces and ICDs were also 
required as a result of requirements development and new requirements.   
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NRL: Atomic clocks 
USNO: Precise time 
NSA: S/A & AS 
DOE (Sandia and Los Alamos): IONDS  
The ICWGs were an excellent means to communicate, coordinate interfaces, assess design 
changes, and resolve problems [8, Fruehauf]. 
     
3.5 Production and Deployment (Phase III, Block II/IIA) 
 
3.5.1 Objective 
 
The objectives of Block II were to “fine-tune loose ends” of the development and issue 
production contracts for 28 SVs [22, Reynolds]. An initial operational capability would be obtained 
with a mix of Block I and Block II satellites and a full operational capability with all Block II 
satellites. The SVs would be launched from the Space Shuttle.   
 
Block II would include improved NDS and SV operating autonomy (ability to operate 
without contact from CS up to 180 days), Anti-Spoofing and Selective Availability capabilities, 
and radiation-hardened electronics to improve reliability and survivability.    
   
3.5.2 Acquisition Strategy 
 
The strategy developed by the JPO was to procure the SVs like an aircraft system, a new 
approach for the space community. There would be a “lot buy,” basically a block buy of the SVs. 
This not only was a cost benefit, but also minimized the approval cycles through the Air Force 
by conducting a concurrent effort in developing the enhancements and incorporating them into a 
production contract [22, Reynolds]. The JPO had developed a Technical Requirement Document 
for this phase. The requirement for the W-Sensor of the NDS was added at a later time and the 
decision was originally made to allow for production incorporation at the 13th satellite.   
 
Since the directed baseline launch vehicle was the Space Shuttle, the Air Force awarded a 
fixed-price contract to McDonnell Douglas to purchase 28 upper stage boosters called Payload 
Assist Modules (PAM-DII). Also, a separate cost-plus-support service contract was negotiated.   
 
The SV segment contract required concurrence by RI, who was reluctant to sign up to a 
firm-fixed-price contract based upon their perceived risk. A team of Rockwell, subcontractors, 
vendors, manufacturing community, JPO, and Aerospace Corporation formulated the development 
plan/program. This included an extensive study of the assembly line at the Rockwell Facility at 
Seal Beach, CA. The team established an acceptable final program [22, Reynolds]. 
  
3.5.3 Nuclear Detection System   
 
 Early in Block I, the GPS program was tasked to include an IONDS as a secondary pay-
load on the SV. The NDS provided a worldwide capability to detect, locate, and report nuclear 
detonations in the earth’s atmosphere or in near-earth space in near-real-time. The GPS was an 
ideal system to implement this capability, as the GPS functional baseline also required world-
wide coverage for navigation that was implemented by the constellation configuration. The JPO 
did not have a requirement for the other elements of NDS: the NDS control segment and the 
NDS user equipment. The NDS sensors were developed by Sandia National Laboratories/Los 
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Alamos National Laboratory and provided GFE to Rockwell.  The Air Force and the Department 
of Energy established a Memorandum of Understanding resulting in new development ICDs and 
some existing ICDs being modified for the interface with the system. Integration of the sensors 
into the SV created no significant issues.   
 
 For Block II, the Air force established a requirement to upgrade to the IONDS system. The 
Nuclear Detonation (NUDET) Detection System (NDS) consisted of an optical sensor (Y-
sensor), an X-ray sensor, a dosimeter, and an Electro-Magnetic Pulse (EMP) sensor (W-sensor). 
The W-sensor was a new function on the NDS. Sandia National Laboratories/Los Alamos 
National Laboratories developed he NDS sensors with the exception of the W-sensor. The JPO 
made a decision, based upon the projected schedule for the integration development effort driven 
by the W-sensor, to incorporate the NDS change later in Block II. The tenth Block II SV 
incorporated the NDS capability, and the NDS GPS satellites received the designation Block IIA. 
The functional baseline was adjusted for this new capability.  Follow-on Block IIR SVs also 
included this capability. 
 
 The systems engineering process identified a technical risk of integrating the W-sensor at 
the beginning of the program.  As the integration effort continued, the task became more 
technically challenging than anticipated. The levels of EMI/EMC were far more sensitive than 
anticipated; i.e. in the 50-150 MHZ range. The basic concept was to make the SV a very good 
Faraday cage. Sandia National Laboratories would not sign up to develop the W-sensor, so 
Rockwell International was given the contractual responsibility for the development and 
contracted with E-Systems to provide the sensor. Sandia National Laboratories continued to 
provide technical support sensors [21, Reaser]. 
 
Gold foil wrap was added to the SV for electro-magnetic protection for the sensitivity of 
the W-sensor. However, the SV solar panel motors emitted sufficient energy through the motor 
shafts that extended beyond the wrap.  The W-sensor was detecting this energy. The simplest 
design fix for the already-designed and validated solar panel system was to add “fingers” to ground 
array shaft pads. This design approach presented an issue of meeting the lifetime requirement. 
The material of the “fingers”, which were in contact with the motor shaft, had to withstand suffi-
cient life cycles without the material wearing away.   
 
Significant studies and testing were required to define the appropriate materials for the 
“fingers”. Ball Aerospace, in Boulder, was contacted to determine the material required for 
fingers. RI and JPO were deeply involved in the assessment. Many combinations of alloys were 
manufactured and tested until an Au/Ni alloy was successfully verified to meet all requirements. 
As Block II was a production contract with concurrent development in specific areas, the 
additional effort on the W-sensor was added via an H-clause in the contract. The schedule was 
not impacted as a result of intense effort, due to the proactive role of the team members [23, 
Robertson].   
 
Integration of the X- and Y-sensors and dosimeter did not create any significant issues, as they 
had been integrated on other satellites.   The verification of the W-sensor required RI to 
build a high-fidelity anechoic chamber. This effort resulted in a 12-14 month schedule impact. 
The cost to the W-sensor integration was $162M [23, Robertson].  
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The gold foil wrap around most of the SV resulted in a buildup of electro-magnetic energy 
within the volume contained by the foil. The solar panel drive motor control system utilized a 
1960s-type technology design with fusible links. There were redundant circuits (A & B strings). 
The combination of the noise energy and the command signal resulted in activation of a fusible 
link on SV-23. The consequence was that there were dual, but opposite, commands sent to the 
drive system. The interim operational fix was a procedural approach by which the control station 
would manually slew the arrays, which was a burden to the operators. The corrective action was 
to incorporate a static trap with a diode and capacitor added to the circuit. This design change 
was incorporated at a later time. The overall issue was a lack of a complete assessment of the 
internal satellite interface requirements and assessing the impact of the gold foil wrap design 
change on existing systems [18, Paul]. A Block IIA satellite is shown in Figure 3-14.  
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Figure 3-14.  Block IIA Satellite 
 
3.5.4 Shuttle Impact to Functional Baseline 
  
The original Phase I plan for launching the Block II SVs was to use an expendable launch 
vehicle. The projected increased weight of the Block II SVs over the Block I SVs exceeded the 
Atlas series rocket payload capability by approximately 800 pounds. Delta rockets were the pre-
ferred approach for the Block II SVs. However, Dr. Hans Mark, Secretary of the Air Force, 
issued a directive around 1979 to exclusively use the shuttle as a launch platform for all Air 
Force space vehicles. This implemented President Carter’s directive in the revised National Space 
Policy for all DoD to launch platforms from the space shuttle to “…take advantage of the 
flexibility of the space shuttle to reduce operating costs over the next two decades” (Ref. 34). This 
program requirement had a significant impact on the SV performance requirements.  
 
The systems engineering process addressed the requirements and risk associated with 
launching from the shuttle. The shuttle was man-rated, which required triple inhibits to cata-
strophic risks and safe arm controls.  It also required a shuttle mission specialist interface for 
launching from the Shuttle. In addition, analysis of the shuttle environment showed it to be more 
severe than normal expendable launch vehicles. An analysis of the shuttle bay capacity 
concluded that four GPS SVs with their required Transfer Orbit Stage and common airborne 
support equipment could be accommodated on one shuttle mission. Performance and interface 
requirements were incorporated into the Block II/Phase III Technical Requirements Document 
(TRD) (Ref. 44). The necessary MOUs and ICDs were established with NASA. A detailed Payload 
Integration Plan was developed for the SVs that complied with all NASA policies, regulations 
and requirements, and was updated on a periodic basis. The JPO conducted a cost-benefit 
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analysis and determined that a lot procurement of Payload Assist Modules (PAM-DII) tailored in 
design for the GPS shuttle launches was cost effective [27, Sponable]. Figure 3-15 shows the 
interface and elements/subsystems of the SV and the Shuttle (DoD Space Transportation 
System).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3-15.  Space Segment System Relationship (Ref. 44) 
 
As the development of the Block II SV continued, weight growth became an issue. Early 
assessments identified the weight risk to the requirement of four SVs per shuttle mission and that 
the capacity may be only three per mission [27, Sponable]. The JPO was reviewing the actual 
operational launching of four satellites with respect to the risk of putting four satellites on one 
launch vehicle.  An additional concern was the potentially lower priority GPS would receive in 
the shuttle manifest. 
  
When the Space Shuttle Challenger disaster occurred in January 1986, the JPO had to de-
velop a risk mitigation plan. There was no backup or funding for alternative launch vehicles. It soon 
became apparent that the shuttle would not be available for operations for some unknown time. Ini-
tial estimates of a six-month slippage kept growing. Further implications were that the shuttle 
facilities at VAFB ended after design changes in the shuttle diminished its capability for polar 
launches. These were key issues for all DoD launches.  Eventually, the Air Force decided to contract 
for expendable launch vehicles on a high priority. To maximize launch flexibility, the JPO 
pursued a dual-access capability by establishing a baseline interface requirement for the Block II 
SV design. The interface could support either launch on the shuttle or a number of alternative 
expendable launch vehicles (ELVs). After a while, the shuttle launch requirement was 
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completely withdrawn, and no DoD satellites were allowed to use the shuttle. The severe 
environmental requirements driven by the shuttle compatibility required minimal changes for 
flight on ELVs, which helped expedite the transition to future ELV boosters [27, Sponable]. The 
functional baseline was again updated.  
 
The acquisition approach for the ELV development followed the typical JPO risk mitiga-
tion approach by awarding the three $6M fixed-price contracts to develop preliminary designs and 
then down-selecting and awarding to the winning contractor. The Titan 3 rocket (Martin Marietta) 
had the ability to launch two SVs at once, but presented a problem in getting the SV to separate and 
transfer into a potentially different orbital plane. The Atlas Centaur rocket (General Dynamics) 
included a liquid-fueled third stage and the system had a significant cost impact. The Delta II 
(McDonnell Douglas) was ultimately selected, due to its lower cost and historical reliability. This 
design selection was a modification of the previous Delta rocket, stretching it about 20 feet and 
adding the bulbous fairing. The design of the fairing had a benefit that some of the SVs antennas 
did not have to be stowed during launch, which would aid reliability requirements [23, 
Robertson]. The Delta II was developed in two consecutive configurations: the first (Delta 6000) 
with an approximate payload capacity of 3670 lbs and the second (Delta 7000). The rationale for 
the two configurations was driven by the need to achieve a first launch date in 1989. A lighter 
payload version of the Delta II could meet the objective launch date (Ref. 33). The larger 4470 lb 
payload configuration for the heavier Block IIA SV with the NDS payload required more 
development time (Ref. 10). 
 
 The JPO developed a plan to use the shuttle as a launch vehicle in parallel with the ELVs 
when the shuttle became operational again. The number of SV launches in the revised plan was 
originally 16 and then reduced to eight as the shuttle return-to-launch schedule slipped. Compli-
cating this plan was the backlog of higher-priority satellites/payloads from other programs that 
could impact the GPS schedule (Ref. 33).  Eventually, the decision was made not to use the 
shuttle. 
 
A very structured process was established for the new ELVs and SVs. Lessons learned 
from launches were reviewed prior to each new launch. An Independent Readiness Review Team 
(IRRT) conducted a review of all qualification/verification items prior to the first launch of a new 
system/subsystem [23, Robertson]. Considering the commitment to develop a launch vehicle quickly, 
a reliable ELV source was developed in about two years.  This would culminate in 28 
consecutive successful launches of the Block II/IIA SVs. Key systems engineering processes that 
helped the program were: risk identification/mitigation, good requirements development, and good 
interface definition. Figure 3.16 shows a launch of a GPS SV on a Delta II rocket. 
 
 
U
S 
A
ir 
Fo
rc
e 
ph
ot
o 
 61
Figure 3-16.  Delta II Launch of Block II Satellites 
 
 The systems engineering process was used to account for the change in the functional base-
line requirement, time lines, and concept of operations with respect to logistics of the SV coming 
off the production line. The GPS program was the first satellite program to have such a large 
production run. The lengthy delay until first launch presented another dilemma for the JPO, namely, 
what to do with the satellites that were scheduled to come off the production line while they were 
waiting for flight. The SV design did not account for extreme lengthy delays before launch. The 
JPO tasked Rockwell to initiate a three-month systems engineering study of three options: stop 
production, slow the production rate, or continue the production rate and develop a storage plan 
and facility. The conclusion of the study was to slow down the rate of production based upon the 
assessment that the ELV would be available in approximately two years. This recommendation 
was implemented [23, Robertson]. 
 
The lot buy of PAM-DII units for use on the shuttle was now obsolete. The cost avoid-
ance approach with a multi-year contract unfortunately became a burden, as there was no need 
for these 28 unique PAM-DIIs for shuttle use. The JPO cancelled contracts for these boosters, 
which resulted in not buying the last 12 units (Ref. 33). In this particular case, the risk of the lot 
buy was accepted based upon a firm requirement from the Secretary of the Air Force committing 
to the shuttle and a good cost-benefit analysis [21, Reaser].   
 
 The Challenger disaster had one benefit to the GPS program, in that it provided 
schedule relief. The CS had software problems and there was a moderate-to-high risk of not 
meeting the original launch date of late 1986. There was an extensive ongoing effort by the 
contractor, Aerospace Corporation, and the JPO to resolve the issues. One of the key issues 
included verification of selective availability. CS software releases were not complete and 
probably would not have supported the Block II SVs on the initial program schedule [20, Prouty]. 
The final operational release of the software occurred just a few months before the first Block II 
launch in February 1989.  The delay in launching SVs into orbit adversely affected the UE 
developmental testing, which had planned on using early Block II SVs.  
 
3.5.5 User Equipment (UE) Development Testing Effects 
  
In April 1985, the JPO awarded the first Low Rate Initial Production Contract (LRIP) to 
Rockwell Collins. The contract included research and development, as well as production options 
for 1-, 2-, and 5-channel GPS airborne, shipboard, and manpack (portable) receivers. This allowed 
the UE to be cut into the F-16 production line. Initial JPO developments and procurements were 
exclusively Line Replaceable Units (LRUs), or "boxes", which included the 3A receiver for high-
dynamic aircraft applications, the 3S receiver for shipboard applications, and the manpack (Figure 
3-17 shows the Rockwell Collins version of the manpack). These were followed by the smaller 
and lighter Miniaturized Airborne GPS Receivers (MAGR) for high- and medium-dynamic aircraft. 
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Figure 3-17.  Rockwell Collins Manpack (Ref. 47) 
 
Aerospace Corp. conducted a threat assessment study for UE receivers. The JPO Systems 
Engineering Directorate followed up with an assessment of the Fixed Reception Pattern Antenna 
(FRPA) and Controlled Reception Pattern Antenna (CRPA) and how a common antenna could 
satisfy all user requirements and save cost through common support and larger procurement of 
units. Due to the orthogonal capability of the CRPA, it was more effective in countering the threats. 
However, at that time, the CRPA was more complex and approximately three times more costly 
than the FRPA. The Navy originally selected the FRPA for its aircraft and then, years later, 
replaced it with the CRPA [18, Paul]. 
 
There were delays in completing the UE: “…operational testing as a result of lingering 
receiver reliability problems and reevaluation of program requirements (that) …caused DoD to 
postpone the GPS receiver set full rate production decision until Sept. 1991, a decision originally 
scheduled for March 1989” (Ref. 38). The UE reliability requirements are included with other Test 
and Evaluation Management Plan (TEMP) operational system performance requirements pro-
vided in Appendix 8 (Ref. 39). Delays in accomplishing operational testing of various receiver 
sets caused DoD to initially postpone operational testing until June 1990. The delays were caused 
by problems in integrating receiver sets with host aircraft and ships, late deliveries of receivers, 
availability of military personnel to conduct Army one- and two- channel tests, and the space 
shuttle accident which delayed launches of SVs needed for testing. On 21 Sep 1990, the Under 
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition postponed a full-rate production for all receiver sets until 
Sept. 1991.  But, he approved continuing LRIP for one-, two-, and five-channel receivers 
through FY 1991, and recommended additional testing of the five-channel receiver sets. Five 
LRIP contracts were awarded to four contractors including Rockwell Collins, the initial LRIP 
contractor. The DSARC IIIB was further slipped to March 1992 (Ref. 40).  
 
3.5.6 Control Segment 
 
The program needed to develop an operational control segment to replace the ICS as the 
Block II SV came on line. There was also a need to upgrade the ICS to ensure continued support 
to the UE segment for their testing while the OCS was being developed. These two tasks were to 
be combined under one contractor effort. In the typical risk mitigation approach, five bidders 
were awarded contracts for concept design studies based upon the CS functional requirements. 
Upon completion of the studies, there was a down-select to three contractors: IBM Gaithersburg, 
Martin Marietta, and General Dynamics. This contractual effort continued to further develop the 
concepts and refine functional requirements, resulting in a pre-SDR functional baseline stage. IBM 
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and Martin Marietta worked to develop prototype labs and modeled receivers. General Dynamics 
had been the contractor during the previous phase. Again, a down-select occurred – this time, 
based upon the functional baseline established, IBM was selected for the continuing 
development. The JPO had difficulty getting IBM’s agreement to requirements because of the 
fluidity of the program. The JPO incentivized the contractual effort and IBM agreed to the effort 
[16, Nakamura]. The contract was awarded in September 1980. The Block II schedule also was 
aggressive and left no margin for issue resolution. Figure 3-18 illustrates the OCS top-level 
system diagram with functional and support groups identified. 
 
IBM had a core of seven to eight personnel with support from other groups. They had no 
previous space background in this division of IBM, but had solid systems engineering processes, 
a good system architecture, and documented system testing and tools [2, Berg]. The JPO 
augmented their lack of domain knowledge with experienced systems engineering people. 
Aerospace Corporation also provided key technical support.  The IBM program approach was to 
have parallel paths for both program management and the technical group directly to the program 
director. This approach ensured that the technical side of the program would have opportunity to 
present their position to upper management when there was disagreement with program 
management [3, Conley]. The control segment process established system requirements and a 
specification tree; established functional block diagrams, physical block diagrams, and internal 
ICDs; and allocated requirements within the organization and to subcontractors and vendors. 
 
The NDS requirements for the CS were minor. The roles and mission of the CS had to be 
defined in order to allocate the appropriate NDS functional requirements to the CS. CS was 
neither responsible for the receipt of the L3 signal nor the functioning of the NDS system.  Their 
responsibilities encompassed performing the NDS command and control of the SV as required 
by the user, identifying the health of the NDS system, and controlling the ambient environment 
(e.g. temperature) in the vicinity of the NDS. 
 
The program offices, both at the JPO and the contractors, knew that the software and error 
budget were high risk.  The mitigation plan was to develop simulation and modeling to validate 
the software designs. Also, a national team of experts from government and industry, including 
the National Bureau of Standards, assisted in trying to resolve the modeling of the atomic clock. 
Ephemeris models were also creating problems. The TPMs used to track the software were pri-
marily software lines of code (SLOC) and defect testing. The selective availability requirement 
was not well defined and was open to several different interpretations. Validation of selective avail-
ability created issues in terms of requirement verification interpretation.  Also, there was no tool 
to analyze the validity of the crypto data. An original estimate of the size of the CS software was 
300K-400K software lines of code [20, Prouty]. The final size was 1.1 million lines of code [24, 
Saad]. Testing of the software was in the traditional method of unit, subsystem, and system tests, 
with FCA and PCA being accomplished at the appropriate levels [16, Nakamura]. Some of these 
issues were a result of the lack of tools to estimate design detail, the lack of clear definition on 
requirements, and an upfront understanding of verification approach/method required. However, 
the systems engineering process was used in successful resolution of the issues.     
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 Figure 3-18.  Operational Control System Top Level System Diagram (Ref. 43) 
 
Initial CS software releases were in support of the Block I SV capability only. This allowed the 
OCS at VAFB to become operational in 1985. The accomplishment was made easier by the lack 
of Selective Availability encryption requirements for these releases that created challenges in 
Block II. (Note: Encryption was still required for satellite command uplink and data to/from the 
ground antennas to the MCS).       
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There was an extensive effort in the 1986 to 1989 period to resolve the Block II software 
problems. Validation and verification became a major issue with the software effort. One of the 
first problems was getting configuration designs and simulations from Rockwell. It was difficult to 
test the interface with the SV in the lab and a field effort was required. After JPO and Aerospace 
Corporation initiatives with Rockwell, a plan was devised and implemented to take Block II quali-
fication boxes and rack, and upgrade the Block I simulator to a Block II configuration. The simu-
lators were taken to Cape Canaveral in 1987-1988 for an extensive, almost full-time, 15-month effort 
allowing IBM to validate the upload and receive capability and interfaces of the CS [3, Conley]. 
Aerospace Corporation provided additional support to IBM in the transition of the OCS from 
Vandenberg AFB to Falcon AFB (now Schriever AFB) with permanent on-site support. This 
effort was the key to success of a final software release. IBM also developed operator and field 
manuals. The final software release (version 3) occurred in 1989, just in time for Block II initial 
launch with Delta rockets.  
  
 Training requirements for the CS were addressed by forming working groups consisting 
of the JPO, Aerospace Corporation, contractors, and operational personnel. Space Command had 
been recently formed and had taken over operations responsibility from SAC. There were no 
Space Command requirements. Interface meetings were established with Space Command. 
However, lack of continuity of key personnel within this new command resulted in different 
perceptions and needs, creating additional issues to address. A clear and concise MOA was 
established between JPO and AFSPC on responsibilities related to the control of Block II SVs 
when in orbit, especially when the JPO wanted to conduct system tests: e.g., deficiency report 
resolution verification, CS upgrade verification, the Y-sensor system level test, etc. 
 
 The SV constellation baseline had been 18 satellites, based upon funding issues early in 
the program that had reduced the constellation from the original 24-constellation configuration. 
In 1987, detailed systems engineering analysis was conducted to determine the limitations of the 
18-satellite constellation configuration. The JPO then briefed the limitations of the 18-satellite 
constellation to the operating commanders, on-site, at various locations around the world. 
Messages were soon received from these commands stating that the limitations of the 18-satellite 
constellation were not acceptable and that a larger constellation configuration should be pursued. 
During this timeframe, the Air Force initiated a trade study of cost-versus-performance and was 
interested in reducing the constellation to a two-dimensional 12-satellite configuration and 
queried the JPO about approach. The JPO already had the answer in terms of current 18-
constellation limitations and what the real warfighter needed. The requirement driven by 
operational commands became a 24-satellite constellation and the Air Force would provide 
funding to support this requirement [11, Green]. This appears to be one of the first times that the 
operational commands became advocates of the program.   
 
Trade studies and additional system assessments of the 24-constellation configuration 
were conducted by the JPO with technical assistance from Aerospace Corporation. Drs. Rhodus 
and Massatt of Aerospace Corporation, in coordination with the JPO, conducted an analysis of 
the constellation configuration.  They considered configurations that were less sensitive to satellite 
drift and would be more robust during multiple satellite failures, resulting in an asymmetrical 
design of the SVs location – see Figure 3-19 (Ref. 18). The functional baseline was updated for 
the latest satellite constellation configuration (Ref. 18). 
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Figure 3-19.  24-Satellite Constellation (Ref. 49) 
 
3.5.7 Requirements Validation & Verification  
 
The JPO and Rockwell jointly established a Satellite Test Criteria Review Board 
(TCRB), which conducted a rigorous review of all SV qualification and acceptance testing 
during Block I [23, Robertson]. The TCRB was a contractual solution due to the JPO last-minute 
substitution of MIL-STD-1540A for MIL-STD-1540 (Test Requirements for Launch, Upper-
Stage and Space Vehicles) in the Block I contract. Rockwell apparently did not realize the change, 
and the satellite and vendor programs were not in compliance [21, Reaser]. Weekly well-structured 
meetings were conducted with extensive efforts to validate qualification requirements and 
determine the root cause before concurrence or approval to proceed to the next event. The board 
consisted of the JPO, prime contractors, vendors, and Aerospace Corporation personnel, with the 
JPO contracting office chairing the meetings [21 Reaser; 23 Robertson]. 
  
OT&E could not be conducted on the SV. There was a need to conduct joint DT&E and 
OT&E. This joint test and evaluation were somewhat unique in this timeframe for the rocket 
community and required close coordination with AFOTEC. The key to making and executing the 
plan was AFOTEC. They helped ensure early identification of acceptance criteria [18, Paul]. 
 
3.6. Replenishment Program Block IIR 
 
3.6.1 Objective  
 
The Block IIR objective was to provide 21 replacement satellites for the Block II/IIA.  
Also included were enhancements such as enhanced autonomy, 180-day degradation, increased 
radiation hardening, cross-link ranging, hot-backup of clocks, and modernization of parts.  
 
3.6.2 Acquisition Strategy 
In accordance with the DSARC II direction to compete the SV contract when the design 
stabilized, the JPO developed a competitive acquisition strategy. In typical JPO contractual 
fashion, risk mitigation was factored into the strategy. The existing satellites were basically 
designed with late 1960s, 1970s, and some early 1980s technologies. Part of the modernization 
was to optimize the navigation payload/bus system. For the modernization of the SV navigation 
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payload/satellite bus, three fixed-price contracts were issued: ITT, Rockwell Autonetics, and 
Garmin to develop breadboard designs.   
 
The JPO issued two fixed-price contracts for the SV segment design, one each to Rock-
well International and General Electric Aerospace. The contractors were to design up to a PDR 
and then there would be a down-select. A caveat was added to this effort: The SV segment con-
tractors were allowed to team with the three vendors developing the breadboard designs for the 
navigation payload/bus system. RI teamed with Autonetics and Garmin, and GE with ITT. The 
down-select occurred, and General Electric Aerospace was awarded the SV contract on 21 Jun 
1989. (Note: Lockheed Martin acquired General Electric Aerospace in 1992).  The JPO strategy 
of competing initial phases of the program had a significant benefit with respect to produceability 
of the Block IIR satellites. Piece parts were reduced by approximately half and touch labor by 
approximately two thirds [23, Robertson]. This approach utilized classic systems engineering 
principles of conducting detailed trade studies and prototyping prior to PDR to validate the 
design concept capability to meet the functional baseline in the most cost-effective manner. The 
competition among vendors/contractors was the forcing function to this process. 
 
3.6.3 Requirements 
  
HQ AFSPC acted as the centralized user for the GPS program in terms of coordinating 
and integrating user requirements. They established the survivability requirement that was a tech-
nology challenge for the program. The increased requirements for hardening in case of nuclear 
detonation in space were beyond the effects of the Van Allen belt radiation requirement. This 
hardening requirement was identified as a risk from the initiation of the effort, and a technology 
development program was initiated to create hardened processor chips to the levels identified in the 
requirement. Once the technology solution of silicon-on-sapphire was identified, a further problem 
of yield rate for growing the crystals was addressed and successfully resolved [23, Robertson].  
 
3.6.4 Critical Design Reviews   
 
In Block 2R, the typical JPO philosophy of risk mitigation was applied in that the SV 
segment was competed between Rockwell International and General Electric Aerospace. Two 
fixed-fee contracts were issued for development up through PDR. A down-select was 
accomplished and General Electric won the contract. The governing requirements document for 
the initial contract was the Block 2R TRD developed by the JPO. The TRD was a carryover as 
the governing system segment document through the initial portion of the effort because of an 
issue with the requirement for the NDS W-sensor to operate through a nuclear event in space. 
General Electric wanted the system segment specification to be written to allow the NDS to “blink”, 
or shutdown and restart, as an interpretation of the requirement. As a result of this non-resolution 
of the issue, the TRD remained the functional baseline document until after CDR [23, Robertson].  
 
An unintended error in the contract tied the production option to both the CDR and its 
scheduled date and not to the CDR event itself. This presented a dilemma to the JPO. The JPO 
assessed that General Electric was not ready for the CDR. Yet, slippage had a major impact on the 
production price option, and the JPO did not want to reopen negotiations. The decision made was 
to conduct the CDR and exercise the option. The CDR was officially closed with numerous action 
items. The risk mitigation plan was to conduct monthly technical interchange meetings to further 
assess the design to the allocated baselines and to address outstanding action items [23, Robertson]. 
Certain programmatic decisions made during the course of a development program may be beyond 
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the classic systems engineering process. The systems engineering process must be flexible enough to 
adapt to these conditions and continue to ensure compliance with requirements and risk 
avoidance/mitigation. In this case, the design risk was mitigated by the continuance of a structured 
process to track the major CDR action items and ensure that the intent of a MIL-STD-1521-type 
CDR was closed at a later time.  Additionally, the risk of design fabrication was identified and 
monitored during this period.  
 
3.6.5 User Equipment  
 
In the late 80s and early 90s, some of the users began to investigate the applicability of 
commercial GPS receiver designs to be adapted to the requirements. The Army had purchased 
the commercial Small Lightweight GPS Receiver (SLGR) in 1989 for demonstration and 
training, and it was not intended to be used in a non-tactical scenario. The manpack was approxi-
mately 8 inches by 12 inches by 18 inches and battery operated, which increased the weight. It 
was not very user friendly to the soldier from the field standpoint, although it met the Army’s 
performance requirements [14, Krishnamurti]. “To reach a general agreement that an NDI (Non-
Development Item) strategy was feasible, the Army had to make tradeoffs in its requirements.  
 
The commercial products were not expected to match the performance of the AN/PSN-8 
manpack, even if the selective availability and anti-spoof modifications were incorporated. 
Accordingly, the Army amended its 1979 requirement for the manpack to take advantage of 
commercial GPS technology. The intent of the changes was to get a system, as an off-the-shelf 
item, that would meet minimum essential requirements, be affordable, be available in the near 
term, and be easy to operate. The challenge was to avoid letting ‘better’ be the enemy of ‘good 
enough’ by curbing the desires of the design engineers to optimize performance” (Ref. 32). The 
JPO and Army still required the selective availability and the anti-spoofing capability, which was 
not a capability in the commercial industry. Some minor modification of the design would be 
required to meet this performance [14, Krishnamurti]. “During the period November 1990 
through June 1991, a government performance specification was coordinated with industry and 
the government. Several industry responses indicated that a product that would meet the PLGR 
requirement could be available by September 1991” (Ref. 32). Contract award was made to 
Rockwell International, Collins Avionics and Communications Division, in March 1993. Table 
3-9 describes the requirements of the PLGR compared to the Army requirements.  Figure 3-20 
provides a clear indication of the trend toward non-developmental items (NDI) in some areas of 
GPS receivers. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3-9.  Army and PLGR Requirements (Ref. 32) System Description 
Characteristic Winning Receiver Requirement 
Size Less than 90 in3 Less than 125 in3 
Weight Less than 4 pounds Less than 4 pounds 
Power Less than 3 watts 3 Watts 
Mean time between failure 18,500 hours 18,500 hours 
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Battery life 10 hours 10 hours 
Military-unique features Full selective availability Full anti-spoofing 
Full selective availability 
Full anti-spoofing 
Type of operation Hand operated Hand operated 
Position, velocity and time @  
100 meters/sec, 2G acceleration 18 meters  18 meters 
Time to first fix Less than 3 min. Less than 5 min. 
Time to subsequent fix Less than 1 min. Less than 1 min. 
Operating temperature -20o to +60oC -20o to +70oC 
Service life 6 year performance/ reliability warranty 5 year performance and reliability 
Unit cost $1,300 in base and first option years; $772 in last option year N/A 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3-20.  DoD of UE Family Tree Collins Manpack (Ref. 35) 
 
3.7 Full Operational Capability  
 
After starting out as a vague new idea to utilize the new space frontier for navigation after 
the launch of Sputnik I, separate technology efforts and studies resulted in a functional baseline 
being established in 1973 for a more accurate and reliable means of worldwide navigation. Nearly 
20 years later on 17 April 1995, Air Force Space Command declared GPS fully operational. The 
system would eventually accomplish one of the DoD’s major goals of consolidating suites of 
military navigation systems. 
   
The system was successfully “battle-tested” in the Persian Gulf War years before the 
Initial Operational Capability (IOC) and proved the operational capability worthy of the program 
visionaries from the late 1960s . 
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The JPO was able to successfully establish themselves as system integrators and 
controller of the functional baseline. With the assistance of Aerospace Corporation, they were 
able to conduct the necessary system trade studies to optimize the functional baseline as 
enhanced requirements were identified and budgets changed. Using the baselined structured 
signal as the key interface, a specification tree was established based upon the interface of those 
signals with the three major segments. Through the well-honed interface control process, the JPO 
was able to manage all the segment specifications and system integration. On the contractors’ 
side and many other supporting government agencies, domain expertise existed at all levels 
which enabled personnel to see the system vision and perform their systems engineering process 
with success. Communications was a key ingredient that was fostered throughout GPS 
development. 
 71
4. SUMMARY 
 
The GPS program presented challenges in various areas such as technology, customers, 
organization, cost, and schedule for a very complex navigation system. This system has become 
a beacon to military and civilian navigation and other unique applications. As best put by 
Gedding, GPS provides “a constellation of lighthouses in the sky …” (Ref. 8). 
 
Several precepts or foundations of the Global Positioning Satellite program are the rea-
sons for its success. These foundations are instructional for today’s programs because they are 
thought-provoking to those who always seek insight into the program’s progress under scrutiny. 
These foundations of past programs are, of course, not a complete set of necessary and sufficient 
conditions. For the practitioner, the successful application of different systems engineering 
processes is required throughout the continuum of a program, from the concept idea to the usage 
and eventual disposal of the system. Experienced people applying sound systems engineering 
principles, practices, processes, and tools are necessary every step of the way. Mr. Conley, 
formerly of the GPS JPO, provided these words: “Systems engineering is hard work. It requires 
knowledgeable people who have a vision of the program combined with an eye for detail.” 
 
Systems engineering played a major role in the success of this program. The challenges 
of integrating new technologies, identifying system requirements, incorporating a system of 
systems approach, interfacing with a plethora of government and industry agencies, and dealing 
with the lack of an operational user early in the program formation required a strong, efficient 
systems engineering process. The GPS program imbedded systems engineering in their 
knowledge-base, vision, and day-to-day practice to ensure proper identification of system 
requirements. It also ensured the allocation of those requirements to the almost-autonomous 
segment developments and beyond to the subcontractor/vendor level, the assessments of new 
requirements, innovative test methods to verify design performance to the requirements, a solid 
concept of operations/mission analysis, a cost-benefit analysis to defend the need for the 
program, and a strong system integration process to identify and control the “hydra” of interfaces 
that the program encountered. The program was able to avoid major risks by their acquisition 
strategy, the use of trade studies, early testing of concept designs, a detailed knowledge of the 
subject matter, and the vision of the program on both the government and contractor side.     
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5. QUESTIONS FOR THE STUDENT 
 
The following questions are meant to challenge the reader and prepare for a case discussion. 
 
Is this program start typical of an ARPA/ DARPA funded effort?   Why or why not? 
 
Have you experiences similar or wildly different aspects of a Joint Program?   
 
What were some characteristics that should be modeled from the JPO? 
 
Think about the staffing for the GPS JPO.  How can this be described?  Should it be 
duplicated in today’s programs?  Can it? 
 
Was there anything extraordinary about the support for this program? 
 
What risks were present throughout the GPS program.  How were these handled? 
 
Requirement management and stability is often cited as a central problem in DoD 
acquisition.  How was this program like, or dislike, most others? 
 
Could the commercial aspects of the User Equipment be predicted or planned?  Should the 
COTS aspect be a strategy in other DoD programs, where appropriate? Why or why not?   
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Appendix 3 – Interviews 
 
 The company affiliation and positions are those held on the GPS during the timeframe of 
the case study. Alphabetical list of interviews include: 
 
1. Ron Beard, TIMATION Program Manager, NRL 
2. John Berg, Aerospace Corporation, Control Segment Engineer 
3. Rob Conley, Air Force, Test, Control Segment and Systems Engineering  
4. Tom Donahue, Air Force, System Test Director Systems Engineering Division  
5. Dr. Malcolm Currie, Office of Secretary of Defense, Director of DDR&E,  
6. Don Duckro, Air Force, Space Vehicle Engineer 
7. Sherman Francisco, IBM,  
8. Hugo Frueholf, Rockwell, Chief Engineer, Block I 
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17. Dr. Brad Parkinson, Air Force, System Program Director  
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19. Ed Powers, Naval Research Laboratory & Naval Observatory  
20. Preston Prouty, Aerospace Corporation, Control Segment Engineer  
21. Rick Reaser, Air Force, Satellite Vehicle and Deputy Program Director 
22. Jim Reynolds, Air Force, Systems Program Director 
23. Doug Robertson, Air Force, Launch Program & Space Vehicle Manager 
24. Joe Saad, Air Force, Division Chief User Equipment, Director System Effectiveness, 
Manager Ground Systems 
25. John Scheerer, Air Force, Director Systems engineering & previous Deputy of Space 
Segment 
26. Dick Schwartz, Rockwell, Program Director 
27. Jess Sponable, Air Force, Space Vehicle, Launch Vehicle Interface  
28. Tom Stansell, Magnavox, User Equipment Engineering    
29. Phil Ward, Texas Instruments, User Equipment Engineering 
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Appendix 5 – Rockwell’s GPS Block 1 Organization Chart 
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Appendix 7 – Operational Performance Requirements  
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